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IN SEARCH OF VALIDITY: A NEW MODEL FOR THE
CONTENT AND PROCEDURAL TREATMENT OF
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT SURVEYS
IRINA D. MANTA*

"Objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play
with, but where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet are they
found?"--WilliamJames
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Trademark scholars and laymen alike find it suspicious when
a company other than Starbucks suddenly starts selling
"Charbucks blend" coffee. One's first intuition is that this is not a
coincidence but rather an attempt to capitalize on the name of a
pre-existing, immensely popular product and potentially cause
losses to the original product through diversion of sales. It hardly
comes as a surprise to learn that in this real-life scenario,
Starbucks sued the maker of Charbucks products for trademark
infringement in the Southern District of New York to prevent
further use of the Charbucks name. What is rather remarkable,
however, is that despite Starbucks' hiring of a well-known law firm
and attacking a product that even the most casual observer
perceives as infringing, Starbucks lost the litigation.'
What

I Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 5981 (LTS), 2005 WL
3527126 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2005).
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happened? The district court simply threw out the survey that
social science experts hired by Starbucks' legal team had prepared
to demonstrate consumer confusion, and without survey evidence
it is generally almost impossible to prove trademark infringement.
Considering the case in a vacuum, the outcome of the
Starbucks litigation could mean that even good law firms and their
experts sometimes make mistakes in survey construction. An
overview of trademark jurisprudence in the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, indicates a broader problem: the standards
governing the treatment of surveys in trademark infringement
cases are vague and unclear, which leads to confusion in the legal
community and leaves trademark owners unable to ensure the
protection of their intellectual property.! The lack of certainty
with respect to survey evidence risks the erosion of consumer trust
in marks and chips away at the signaling function of trademarks,
thus preventing marks from properly fulfilling their primary
purpose.
A world devoid of trademark protection is difficult to imagine
and has in fact barely existed.' Even marks developed thousands
of years ago served the purposes of those present today:
trademarks allowed for advertising, answered questions of
ownership, and provided quality seals.4 In modern language, it is
said that trademarks "seek[] to economize on information costs by
providing a compact, memorable, and unambiguous identifier of
a product or service." 5 Trademarks thus both serve to attract
consumers to a good in the first place and then encourage
consumers to return to the product. If an individual liked a
particular product, a consistently used mark will give him the
assurance that whenever he next encounters a product with the
familiar mark, he will enjoy another item that has the same
producer and properties as the initial good. Naturally, a producer
2 The makers of Charbucks products, of course, believe that the outcome of the case
was fair and tell a vastly different story on the issue of trademark infringement. See Black
2006,
9,
Aug.
About?,
All
It's
What
Roastery,
Micro
Bear
http://www.blackbearcoffee.com/Starbucks/What's it all about.htm ("How could our
'microscopic' use of the term possibly have any effect on what has been viewed as one of
the most spectacular name recognition success stories ever. The preposterous notion that
we could possibly slowdown the Starbucks 'freight train' simply didn't occur to us.").
3 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL

AGE 529 (3d ed. 2003) ("Trademarks have existed for almost as long as trade itself."). The
first identifiable marks were words or symbols that identified a good's maker and were
found on objects as many as four thousand years old. Id. (citing WILLIAM H. BROWNE, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS 1-14 (1885)). For a more extensive account of the
history of trademarks, see generally Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution
of Trademarks-FromSignals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1992).
4 MERGES ET AL., subra note 3, at 529.
5 Thomas R. Lee, DemvstifvineDilution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 859, 887 n.190 (2004) (quoting
Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody FairUse?, 21J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992)).
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will in turn potentially reap rich financial rewards for distributing
popular, high-quality products because customers will return to
buy more of the same.6 This relationship between producers,
consumers, and trademarks can only operate properly, however, if
7
a particular trademark designates only a single product or origin.
Imagine, as an extreme case, a consumer buying a bottle with the
familiar Coca Cola label only to find herself drinking a noncaffeinated, strawberry-flavored beverage that was made by a
company of a much lower reputation. Indeed, "brand names
serve as information 'chunks.' They represent core nodes in
memory around which other 'associated' information is connected
and organized. Given only a familiar brand name, a host of
relevant and important information can be efficiently called into
consciousness."'
When this link between brand names and
memory is disrupted because, for instance, another product falsely
evokes the memories one associates with the original good,
consumer confusion and disappointment ensue.9
To avoid situations of consumer confusion and the
subsequent potential consumer dissatisfaction and losses to
trademark owners, Congress passed legislation against trademark
infringement. 0 Most famously, Congress enacted the Lanham
Act 1 in 1946 to prevent trademark infringement and false
advertising.
Since the inception of the Act, the extent of
intellectual property protection offered to trademark owners has
greatly increased.12 One of the most important additions to the
6 See, e.g., Joshua Kennon, Starbucks Franchise Value-A Case Study of an Excellent
Business,
ABOUT.COM,
Jan.
17,
2005,
http://beginnersinvest.about.com/cs/newinvestors/a/O21103a.htm
(attributing the fact
that "from 1997 to 2001, [Starbucks's] revenues increased from $975,389,000 to over
$2,648,980,000" to the company's "powerful brand name.").
7 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30
J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987) ("To perform its economizing function a trademark or
brand name. . . must not be duplicated.").
8 Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary Meaning
Genericism, Fame, Confusion and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1024-25 (2001).
9 But see Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291 (2003)
(arguing against the dangers of equating evocation with infringement).
10 See, e.g., 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION . 2:33 (4th ed. 1996) ("Almost all trademark disputes are between firms
that use conflictina marks; the consumer is not a party to the litigation. But it is the
consumer's state of mind that largely controls the result . . . .") (footnote omitted).
Professor McCarthy explains that trademark infringement both "inhibits competition"
and "deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish among the goods of competing
manufacturers." Id. (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.14
(1982)).
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1052 (2006).
12 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLrTICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
LAW
2
(2004),
available
at
http://aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=985 (using the number of words in the
Lanham Act and other intellectual property statutes as a "crude measure of the expansion
in intellectual property rights.., since most of these statutes expand such rights or create
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initial text of the Lanham Act was the 1995 passage of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) .
The FTDA, which did not
require a showing of likelihood of consumer confusion, was
designed to protect against uses of famous marks that would lead
to the tarnishment of marks' image as well as the blurring of
marks' distinctiveness. 4
Courts have allowed the introduction of several types of
evidence to demonstrate that consumer confusion has occurred in
violation of the Lanham Act, the specific test consisting of whether
there is a "likelihood of confusion."'" Likelihood of confusion can
be shown by demonstrating that the defendant intentionally
imitated or copied the plaintiffs mark, 6 that there was actual
consumer confusion in the marketplace, 7 and, most crucially,
through consumer surveys.' The importance of consumer surveys
in the context of trademark litigation cannot be overemphasized: 9
new ones rather than reduce existing rights," and noting that the Lanham Act "had
10,640 words in 1946, 13,345 in 1987, a jump to 20,136 in 1988 with the passage of the
Trademark Revision Act, and 24,750 in 2000."); see also William M. Landes, An Empirical
Analysis of Intellectual Property, 41 HoUS. L. REv. 749, 750 n.1 and accompanying text
(2004) (citing LANDES & POSNER, supra at 4 and noting that there has been little increase
in intellectual property litigation over the past twenty-five years but great growth in the
"output and legal protection of intellectual property").
13 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
14 For a short description of the FTDA, see Trademark Dilution, BITLAW, Jan. 17, 2005,
http://www.bitlaw.com/trademark/dilution.html. Prior to the enactment of the FTDA,
trademarks were often protected against dilution through a number of state statutes.
Many states modeled their anti-dilution statutes after the Model State Trademark Bill
which was developed by the International Trademark Association, available at
http://www.inta.org/policy/mstb.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
For critiques of
current trademark dilution doctrine, see Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The
Rational Limits of Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122 (1993).
15 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 23:12.
McCarthy also states that courts have
consistently held that, "[t]o prove liability, the plaintiff is not required to prove any
instances of actual confusion." Id. (footnote omitted).
16 2 id. § 15:38 ("Evidence that defendant knowingly imitated or copied plaintiff's
symbol has long been regarded as probative of likely customer confusion.") (footnote
omitted). But see Timothy R.M. Bryant, Trademark Infringement: The Irrelevance of Evidence of
Copying to Secondary Meaning, 83 NW. U. L. REv. 473, 511 (1989) (concluding that evidence
of copying should not be admitted in Lanham Act cases) (cited in 2 MCCARTHY, supra
note 10, § 15:38 n.10).
17 3 MCCARTHY, suora note 10, . 23:13 ("Convincing evidence of significant actual
confusion occurring under actual marketplace conditions is the best evidence of a
likelihood of confusion."). See generallv Michael 1. Allen, The Role of Actual Confusion
Evidence in Federal Trademark Infringement Litigation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REv. 19 (1994) (cited
in 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 23:13 n.1).
18 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 32:195 (calling surveys "the most direct method of
demonstrating secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion") (citing Charles Jaquin
Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 476 (3d Cir. 1990)). A number of
courts have chosen to "treat[] market survey evidence as evidence of actual confusion
even though it is limited to responses to the artificially created survey stimuli." Allen,
supra note 17, at 27-28.
19 Jack P. Lipton, Trademark Litigation:A New Look at the Use of Social Science Evidence, 29
ARIz. L. REv. 639 (1987). The author states:
In the trademark area, social science surveys, generally pertaining to the state of
mind of prospective purchasers, have been offered as evidence of the existence
of secondary meaning or consumer confusion. Surveys have also been used
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intellectual property protection for trademarks focuses on
potentially false impressions created in market actors, and surveys
constitute the main tool to measure "the mental state of some
segment of the consuming public." 20 As is often the case with
social science, however, many questions have arisen as to the
proper construction of surveys used in trademark litigation. 2' This
article focuses on some of the issues that have provoked
controversy in a significant number of cases that employed
trademark-related surveys, such as what the stimulus in consumer
surveys should consist of, and what test courts should articulate for
Stimuli are
whether the proper stimulus has been used.
commonly understood as the materials that survey subjects face
that are supposed to represent the potentially infringing product
or service. This article argues that courts' treatment of acceptable
survey stimuli has been plagued by inconsistencies and that courts
need to more clearly elucidate ex ante rules of what will constitute
proper stimuli to demonstrate Lanham Act violations. This article
also discusses the standards for survey components directly related
to survey stimuli, namely, control stimuli, environmental cues, and
the formulation of proper questions, and strives to provide a
consistent model for the contents and formats of surveys.
Part II of this article will expand on the use of surveys in
trademark-related cases and explain the general principles of
correct survey construction. Part III will scrutinize the theoretical
underpinnings of survey contents as well as how courts treat
surveys, with a particular focus on cases in the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. An examination of Second Circuit cases is
especially appropriate for this type of analysis because the Second
Circuit handled a significant number and perhaps the most
trademark-related cases of any Circuit.2 2 Part III will also attempt
specifically to assess whether a brand name has become generic. Finally, parties
have attempted to introduce survey evidence in support of or in opposition to
an application for federal trademark registration. It has been stated that the
evaluation of survey evidence is one of the most controversial and difficult
problems confronting the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and other judicial
entities dealing with trademark cases. Nevertheless, surveys, as a means of
assessing consumers' state of mind, have played an essential role in aiding courts
to make factual findings under the appropriate legal test.
Id. at 641-42 (footnotes omitted).
20 Id. at 642.
21 See, e.g., Susan J. Becker, Public Opinion Polls and Surveys as Evidence: Suggestions for
Resolving Confusing and Conflicting Standards Governing Weight and Admissibility, 70 OR. L.
REV. 463 (1991).
22 A search of Westlaw's court of appeals database (CTA) and district court database
(DCT) with the synopsis search "sy(trademark!)" found many more trademark-related
cases in the Second Circuit than in any other circuit, with the exception of the Federal
Circuit. There were 1,332 cases in the Second Circuit as opposed to the next largest
number, 542 cases, found in the Ninth Circuit, between 143 and 485 cases in the other
circuits, and 1,687 in the Federal Circuit. While this is a very rough estimate and contains
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to demonstrate the obstacles that courts in the Second Circuit
have faced when determining the validity of survey contents and
critique tensions between different decisions of the court. Part IV
proposes a model for rules regarding surveys that courts should
implement that both conform to the Rule of Law and serve as
clearer guidelines than has been exemplified thus far in the
jurisprudence. This Part also discusses alternative approaches to
resolving survey issues, such as pre-clearance of surveys through
the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) and the creation of
congressional guidelines for surveys.
Part V concludes by
emphasizing the need to apply the suggested changes to
trademark jurisprudence.
II.

SURVEYS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

A. The Idea of Likelihood of Confusion
The original Lanham Act of 1946 stated that using a mark
"likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to
the source or origin of such goods or services"23 constitutes
trademark infringement. While the legislative history of the
Lanham Act does not directly address Congress' choice of those
words, it does clearly state the overall purpose of the law: to
"protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a
product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows,

several errors of measurement, the significant disparity in numbers does tend to suggest
that the Second Circuit probably decides the greatest numbers of trademark-related cases
in the country. There are several reasons to employ the Second Circuit for analysis rather
than the Federal Circuit. This includes the fact that the database search here displays
particularly unreliable results for the Federal Circuit as illustrated from the count of the
numbers of search results thatjust involved the "Patent and Trademark Office" generally.
A number of reasons have led to the large number of trademark suits in the Second
Circuit. For one, many industries are located in New York, such as the media,
entertainment, fashion, and toys and games businesses, all of which generate trademark
disputes. In terms of industries, New York City and Los Angeles present the most logical
locations for such suits. Many trademark lawyers prefer to initiate actions in New York
City rather than Los Angeles because one can obtain preliminary injunctions in the
Southern District of New York within a very short time, and because the Second Circuit is
considered more reasonable and consistent than the Ninth Circuit, in which Los Angeles
is located.
Another motivation for exploring Second Circuit precedent is that several of the
most significant appellate court cases regarding trademark infringement that inspired the
jurisprudence of courts across the country originated in the Second Circuit. See, e.g.,
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) (providing a test to
determine the presence of trademark infringement); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie
Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (defining a test for the trustworthiness of
trademark infringement surveys); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (establishing that the hearsay rule does not bar the admission of
consumer surveys).
23 Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 32(1)(a), 60 Stat. 427, 437 (1946) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006)).
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it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get"24 and to
ensure the trademark owner is "protected in his investment from
its misappropriation by pirates and cheats." 5
Congress also
emphasized its desire to "eliminate judicial obscurity . . . and
[make] relief against infringement prompt and effective. " 2' Any
analysis or critique of current trademark infringement
jurisprudence must consider these expressions of legislative intent.
Courts have had to make the statutory concept of likelihood
of confusion operational in a judicial setting. They have had to
define both what it means for a mark to be likely to cause
confusion and how trademark owners can prove the existence of
this confusion. One trademark expert elaborates on these points:
Likelihood of confusion concerns the probable or actual
actions and reactions of people, making it fundamental to
understand how they make their decisions to buy or not to buy.
A realistic evaluation of consumer confusion must attempt to
recreate the conditions in which buying decisions are made,
and the court should try to determine not what it would do, but
what a reasonable purchaser in market conditions would do.2"
Two of the most important aspects of substantiating a claim based
on likelihood of confusion can be summarized as requiring 1) a
demonstration of a particular subjective state of mind on the part
of consumers and 2) that the potential confusion is one that
would take place in the actual marketplace.2 ' Trial courts must
show particular care when deciding how to evaluate evidence
surrounding likelihood of confusion because their rulings on
these issues will constitute factual findings subject to the "clearly
erroneous" standard if the case reaches an appellate court. Such
a high barrier means that if a trial court rules incorrectly on a
matter of likelihood of confusion, the wronged party may never be
H.R. REP. No. 79-219, at 2 (1945); accordS. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
H.R. REP. No. 79-219, supra note 24, at 2.
Id.
RICHARD L. KIRKPATRIcK, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW § 2.2
(2006) (footnotes omitted).
28 Kirkpatrick emphasizes this point further:
The court is not concerned with mere theoretical possibilities of confusion,
deception, or mistake or with de minimis situations but with the practicalities of
the commercial world, with which the trademark laws deal. The realities of the
marketplace control because that is where confusion of prospective purchasers
would or would not occur. The public's perspective controls, not the court's.
Id. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
29 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 23:69 (explaining that Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure imposes the "clearly erroneous" standard on courts of appeals)
(citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 857-58 (1982) ("An appellate
court cannot substitute its interpretation of the evidence for that of the trial court simply
because the reviewing court might give the facts another construction, resolve the
ambiguities differently, and find a more sinister cast to actions which the District Court
apparently deemed innocent.")).
24

25
26
27
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able to obtain a remedy for the court's mistake.
Over the years, Congress cast a relatively wide net to capture
many different kinds of confusion. One source explains that
"Congress 'evinc[ed] a clear purpose to outlaw the use of
trademarks which are likely to cause confusion, mistake, or
deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers nor simply as to
source of origin."'30 The types of confusion that give rise to a
cause of action include "source confusion,"'" "sponsorship
confusion,"32 "reverse confusion, 33 "subliminal and associational
confusion,"34 and "confusion of marks and of products. '35 Courts
have created a number of multi-factor tests to determine whether
there is likelihood of confusion.
One of the most famous
standards is the one developed by the Second Circuit in Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.,3 6 where the court established an
eight-factor test for infringement:
Where the products are different, the prior owner's chance of
success is a function of many variables: [1] the strength of his
mark, [2] the degree of similarity between the two marks, [3]
the proximity of the products, [4] the likelihood that the prior
owner will bridge the gap, [5] actual confusion, and [6] the
reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark,
[7] the quality of defendant's product, and [8] the
sophistication of the buyers.37
While the other circuits use slightly modified factors, the tests
tend to be much more similar than different, 38 and all circuits
30 KIRKPATRICK, supra note 27, at 129 (quoting Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich
Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971)).
31 Id. § 1.4.A (explaining that a source "is the entity which controls the nature and
quality of the product") (footnote omitted).
32 Id. § 1.4.B (labeling "confusion about sponsorship, approval or certification by one
source of the goods or services of another, or about an affiliation, connection or
association between one source and another" as sponsorship confusion) (footnote
omitted).
33 Id. § 1.4.C (explaining that "reverse confusion is the misimpression that the
newcomer is the source or sponsor of the prior user's goods") (footnote omitted).
34 Kirkpatrick states:
The consumer may subliminally or subconsciously identify the properties and
reputation of one product with those of another, although he can identify the
particular manufacturer of each. Even if consumers do not consciously assume
that the defendant's product is somehow affiliated with plaintiffs product, there
is the likelihood that consumers will be attracted to defendant's product on the
strength of the goodwill and positive image established by plaintiff. Thus, the
newcomer may gain a foothold in the first user's market by exploiting
subliminal associations with the prior mark.
Id. § 1.4.D (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
35 Id. § 1.4.E (stating that "confusion may relate to the public's knowledge that the
trademark, which is 'the triggering mechanism' for the sale of the product, originates with
the plaintiff') (footnote omitted).
36 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
37 Id. at 495.
38 For an excellent summary of the tests adopted by each circuit, see KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 27, § 2.4. The different tests generally include the following common factors:
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allow the use of trademark survey evidence. Although this article
focuses on the jurisprudence of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, the proper implementation of the federal statutory
framework of the Lanham Act inherently poses similar problems
for every circuit. 9 Thus, the solutions proposed in this article are
targeted towards adoption across circuits.
B. Use of the Survey Method to EstablishLikelihood of Confusion
As previously mentioned, it is critical to examine the mindset
of actual or potential customers to determine their level of
confusion about a possibly infringing product. Unfortunately, a
judge cannot just stop people and directly ask them whether they
would feel confused about a good or not. Most direct questions
would either bias or confuse the customer ("are you likely to be
confused as to who made this bottle of soda?") and would not
reach individuals' subconscious cognitive processes that often
affect their decisions.
Thus, courts often need to rely on
consumer survey evidence as an indirect measure of consumer
confusion. In fact, McCarthy notes that "[a]s the use of surveys
has become more common, judges have to come to expect that a
survey will be introduced to aid the court in determining
customers' state of mind" and the lack of a survey is sometimes
taken as a sign "that a litigant is less than deadly serious about its
case."4°
Consumer surveys are conducted in a number of forms and
media. As a general matter, one or both of the litigants hire social
science experts to conduct surveys that provide evidence for or
against the existence of confusion on the part of potential product
or service users. To do so, experts present consumers with a
representation of the allegedly infringing product and ask them a
number of questions that indirectly measure the level of confusion
(e.g., who the consumers think made the product at issue, what
"the strength of the senior mark; the similarity of the marks; the relatedness of the
products and marketing channels; the consumers and their degree of care; actual
confusion; and the junior user's intent." Id. For a summary of the factors used in
different circuits in tabular form, see Edward George Epstein, Surveys: GrowingAdmissibility
but Narrow Utilization,83 TRADEMARK REP. 863, 871 (1993).
39 For further evidence showing that different circuits have encountered similar
problems when deciding the admissibility and weight of various surveys, see Daniel A.
Klein, Admissibility and Weight of Consumer Survey in Litigation Under Trademark Opposition,
Trademark Infringement, and False Designationof Origin Provisions of Lanham Act (15 US.C.A.
§§ 1063, 1114, and 1125), 98 A.L.R. FED. 20 (2005).
40 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 32:195; see also Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co., 99
Civ. 10115 (RWS), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1845, at *72 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2003) (quoting
Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, 35 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The lack of
survey evidence counts against finding actual confusion.")); E.S. Originals Inc. v. Stride
Rite Corp., 656 F. Supp. 484, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[T]hat [plaintiff] did not undertake a
consumer survey... strongly suggests that a likelihood of confusion cannot be shown.").
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other products originate from the same maker, etc.). Experts
record consumers' answers and perform statistical analyses on the
survey results. Usually, surveys also contain representations of
control products such that experts can compare the amount of
confusion that occurs with the allegedly infringing product against
the baseline of how much confusion even an entirely neutralWhile surveys differ in their
looking product would cause.
execution, number and exact formulation of questions, and
product representations, they usually share basic characteristics.4'
In early trademark cases, judges tended to reject the survey
method, partly based on hearsay concerns, or asked for live
witnesses in addition to survey results.42 In the end, however,
courts "recognized that survey evidence was not proof of the truth
of the survey respondents' assertions but instead was offered
simply to show their state of mind when confronted with the
survey stimulus."4
Once this barrier had been cleared, courts
generally accepted surveys as evidence and determined that
questions as to the credibility that a survey should be accorded
needed to go to the weight rather than the admissibility of the
survey." Thus, it sometimes became the jury's task to decide
whether a survey was trustworthy.4 5 This standard radically
changed with the decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
4 6 which recognized a "gatekeeping role for the
Pharmaceuticals,
judge"" in deciding whether to admit expert evidence.48 The

41 For an explanation of some of the main survey formats that experts use, see Itamar
Simonson, The Effect of Survey Method on Likelihood of Confusion Estimates: Conceptual Analysis
andEmpirical Test, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 364 (1993).
42 Lipton, supra note 19, at 644-47. "The hearsay rule may still apply if the people who
actually conducted the surveys are not available for cross-examination in either trial or
deposition." Id. at 646 (citations omitted).
43 G. Kip Edwards, Lanham Act Surveys After Daubert:Lessons LearnedSo Far,677 PLI/PAT
421, 423 (2001) (citing 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, §§ 32:270-32:271). Edwards adds:
"The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, and specifically Rule 703, put to
rest any hearsay objection to survey evidence, at least when the evidence was offered to
prove state of mind." Id.
44 Id. at 424.
45 Commenting on procedure in trademark infringement and unfair competition
litigation, McCarthy states: "In the federal courts, the right to trial by jury for civil legal
actions of over $20 is guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In
the state courts, the right to trial by jury in legal actions is guaranteed by the state
constitution of most states." 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 32:122 (citations omitted).
While plaintiffs do not always request jury trials, the number ofjury trials in the trademark
infringement context greatly increased in the 1970s. Id. "The publicity given to the multimillion dollar jury verdict in the BIGFOOT case may have had something to do with the
increasing popularity of jury trials in trademark cases." Id. § 32:122 n.3 (quoting Big 0
Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo. 1976)).
46 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
47 Id. at 597.
48 For a more extended discussion of Daubert's gate-keeping function, see Richard J.
Leighton, Using Daubert-Kumho Gatekeeping to Admit and Exclude Surveys in Lanham Act
Advertising and Trademark Cases, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 743, 747-53 (2002).
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DaubertCourt explained that "the trial judge must ensure that any
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable. 49 The Supreme Court later extended
Daubertfrom scientific expert testimony to "all expert testimony."5
On appeal, so-called "Daubert motions" that attempt to exclude
unreliable evidence are subject to the "abuse of discretion"
standard." Endowing courts with this gatekeeping function has
increased the pressure on judges to objectively determine what
constitutes acceptable evidence. Mistakenly throwing out a survey
in a trademark case could cause irreparable damage to a plaintiff
given the central nature of the survey in proving likelihood of
confusion. Denying a Daubertmotion, however, sends a signal that
the judge lends at least some credibility to the survey and that a
jury would do well to use the survey results in their decision.
Thus, judges cannot simply use an overwhelmingly strong
presumption of trustworthiness for surveys-the fact that a
decision on the Daubertmotion could decide the whole case simply
raises the stakes too high. It is generally understood that "no
survey is perfect" and that some problems "in questions and
methodology should only affect the weight accorded survey
results"52 rather than admissibility under Daubert. At the same
time, it is troublesome if many surveys are admitted that are later
accorded little to no weight by the jury orjudge
49

Daubert,509 U.S. at 589.

50 Edwards, supra note 43, at 426 n.2 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.

137 (1999)).
51 Id. Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals quipped that the "abuse of
discretion standard... basically asks, 'Would the trial judge have to have been drunk or
crazy to make this decision?' If we think a sober person could come to that conclusion,
then we have to let it stand." (quoting Alex Kozinski, Expert Testimony After Daubert, 192J.
ACCT.
ONLINE
59,
60
(2001),
available
at
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/jul2001/kozinski.htm).
52 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 32:170 (quoting Selchow & Righter Co. v. Decipher,
Inc., 598 F. Supp. 1489, 1502 (E.D. Va. 1984)).
53 One commentator states:
In Lanham Act cases, expert testimony in the form of surveys and related
opinion is regularly proffered to prove how advertisements or trademarks
influence perceptions. Since at least 1960, federal guidelines have urged trial
Judges to conduct a pretrial inquiry into the reliability of proffered expert survey
evidence. Nonetheless, many courts and influential reference works have
employed, without substantive explanation, an admit-it-now-worry-about-it-later
presumption for surveys that contain alleged methodological or technical faults.
Many courts simply admit allegedly faulty surveys into evidence for later
determination of their weight, if any at all. Reviewers have determined that
surveys in Lanham Act false advertising cases "appear almost never to be
relected," yet 23 percent of them were accorded little or no weight by the
factfinder (the iury or the judge in a non-iury proceeding).
Leighton, sulra note 48, at 743-44 (footnotes omitted) (citing Jacob lacoby et al., Survey
Evidence in Deceptive Advertising Cases Under the Lanham Act: An Historical View of Comments
from the Bench, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 541, 549-50 (1994)); see also Kenneth A. Plevan,
Daubert's Impact on Survey Experts in Lanham Act Litigation,95 TRADEMARK REP. 596, 605-06
(2005) (examining forty-four cases that contained Lanham Act surveys between 1997 and
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Daubert and its progeny had a profound impact on trademark
litigation. Attorneys began to file and win motions to exclude
their opponents' survey evidence prior to trial. 4 Courts, however,
exercised their gatekeeping function by making what one expert
called "decisions that border on the schizophrenic."5 5 The reasons
for this predicament are manifold, but at its root is the complexity
of the task itself, which Judge Kozinski on the Ninth Circuit
pointed out on remand in the Daubertcase:
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme
Court opinion, is to resolve disputes among respected, wellcredentialed scientists about matters squarely within their
expertise, in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to
what is and what is not "good science," and occasionally to
because it was not "derived by the
reject such expert 5testimony
6
scientific method."

After some lower courts attempted to limit the effect of Daubert to
only certain classes of "scientific" expert evidence,57 the Supreme
Court clarified in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichae"8 that the framework
should apply to all types of expert evidence. While doing so
already proved difficult for purely scientific questions, the
inherently vague nature of evidence of a social scientific nature
certainly did not simplify matters. Social science tends to allow
more room for expert bias and does not always easily lend itself to
falsification.5 9 The importance of resolving questions surrounding

2004 and finding that courts excluded or gave no weight to the "not-insignificant
number" of fourteen of them).
54 Leighton, supra note 48, at 745-46.
55 Id. at 746 (footnote omitted).
Judge
56 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
Kozinski calls this new framework a "Brave New World." Id. Others have also noted
similar difficulties on the part of lower courts to implement Daubert. See, e.g., David L.
Faigman, The Law's Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on the Law's Use of
Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661, 664-69 (2000). But see
Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Daubert and the Reference Manual:An Essay on the Future
of Science in Law, 82 VA. L. REV. 837, 857 (1996) (noting the positive consequences of the
Daubertdecision, such as how it will improve the ways in which "courts can learn about the
real world").
57 Faigman, supra note 56, at 665.
58 Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). After the Kuhmo Tire decision,
the scholarly community often used the term "Daubert-Kumho framework" to refer to
Daubert and its progeny. An amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence later codified
the requirements of this framework. FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring testimony experts to be
"based upon sufficient facts or data" and "the product of reliable principles and
methods," and requiring the expert witness to have "applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case").
59 One scholar states that the psychology field "is somewhat of a hybrid ....
While
most people would admit that psychological research is more 'scientific' than other social
sciences such as history or sociology, most would also contend that it is nowhere as
'scientific' as the physical sciences, such as biology, chemistry, and physics." David
McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of
NontraditionalPsychologicalEvidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 29 (1987).
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admission of expert social science has perhaps nowhere been as
dramatic as in the context of criminal law, where decisions on the
reliability of data concerning eyewitness identification, battered
woman syndrome, repressed memories, and many other areas can
have a significant impact on questions of life and death, or at least
of freedom and incarceration.6" While this article does not seek to
perform an in-depth exploration of the dilemmas that Daubert
poses outside the trademark context, it is interesting to note that
courts have encountered many of the same problems exercising
their gate-keeping function in these other areas. As one expert
summarizes the treatment of forensic identification science under
Daubert
[T] his area of law is riddled with contradiction, confusion and
Here is an area of law typified by uninformed
chaos.
acceptance or rejection (usually the former) of empirical claims
that courts rarely made any effort to try to understand; by
judicial opinions that failed to explain the courts' reasoning
about the asserted expertise; by evasion or manipulation of the
governing legal tests, or the use of no legal test at all ... 6
It does not appear that courts have found a satisfying response to
the challenges that Daubert poses to social science outside
trademark law, either. Any proposals to modify judicial treatment
of trademark infringement surveys will accordingly benefit from
fairly little guidance from other legal fields that Daubertaffects and
will have to stand on their own.
A body of scholarship has begun to develop that seeks to
guide courts in making objective decisions about the different
elements of trademark surveys, both when deciding the
admissibility and subsequently when making a decision on the
Trademark survey expert Michael
weight of the evidence.
Rappeport wrote an extensive article on the criteria courts should
use to evaluate the validity of surveys.6" He warns that surveys are
by necessity "imperfect," mainly because people never act exactly
the same when surveyed as in real life, the resources available to
conduct surveys are limited, and often surveyed individuals just do
not know the answer to the crucial questions in a case.6"
Nonetheless, many aspects of surveys can be substantially
improved if their conductors keep certain guiding principles in

60 Some of these fields of social science expertise are mentioned in Faigman, supra
note 56, at 674.
61 Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters with
ForensicIdentificationScience, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1128 (1998).
62 Michael Rappeport, Litigation Surveys-Social "Science" As Evidence, 92 TRADEMARK
REP. 957 (2002).
63 Id. at 960.
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mind. First, a surveyor must ask himself what the "universe" of a
study should be-who are the relevant people to interview and
how should one properly obtain a representative sample from that
group?6 4 Broadly speaking, the right type of universe is one that
"focuses on potential purchasers of the defendant's products or
services,"65 but several other issues that are beyond the scope of
this article must be considered as well.66 Next, the surveyor must
determine the content of the study, which includes choosing an
interview setting, defining the questions to ask and their order,
and selecting survey stimuli as well as control stimuli.6 7 Some of
these decisions overlap in significant ways.
For example,
conducting a phone-only survey just allows for the use of auditory
stimuli while a mail-in survey can only convey visual elements.68
The next Part will focus on the survey contents and formats
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has deemed acceptable. The
analysis of the related cases will show that courts need to establish
clearer rules for what they deem acceptable options and will
conclude with a proposal of how they should go about that task.
This Part also discusses alternative ideas involving the potential
role of the PTO and legislative guidance to resolve these issues.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT TREATMENT OF SURVEY CONTENTS
AND FORMATS THROUGH THE EXAMPLE OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT

A. The Role of Survey Stimuli in the Second Circuit's
Trademark InfringementJurisprudence
What constitutes proper survey stimuli has been one of the
key issues plaguing the jurisprudence on survey contents. The
general understanding has been that survey stimuli must either be
1) the potentially infringing product itself or 2) a representation
thereof that resembles the potentially infringing product in all the

64 Id. at 963-65. Many of the surveys that fail scrutiny do so because of an improperly
defined universe. See, e.g., Winning Ways, Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear, Inc., 913 F. Supp.
1454, 1467 (D. Kans. 1996) (calling a survey definition of the consumer market universe
"fatally underinclusive") (cited in Edwards, supra note 43, at 429-30).
For further
examples of surveys that displayed a defective universe, see Sandra Edelman, How to
Construct a Valid Confusion Survey, 720 PLI/PAT 391, 397405 (2002).
65 See Edelman, supra note 64, at 405.
66 For a summary of factors to consider in survey universe construction, see id. For
further discussion on the topic of proper universe construction, see Robert C. Bird,
Streamlining Consumer Survey Analysis: An Examination of the Concept of Universe in Consumer
Surveys Offered in Intellectual Property Litigation, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 269 (1998); Shashank
Upadhye, Trademark Surveys: Identifying the Relevant Universe of Confused Consumers, 8
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 549 (1998).
67 See, e.g., Rappeport, supra note 62, at 978.
68 A discussion of the stimuli-related problem created by interview structures that are
not directly in person will follow infra Part III.
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ways that are relevant to judge the existence of infringement.
Surveys generally also contain corresponding control stimuli such
that researchers can compare the level of confusion of the
potentially infringing product to a basic threshold.69 As will
become clear below, survey and control stimuli have consisted of
such diverse items as actual products, modified products, images
of products, and spoken words. Courts have often struggled with
deciding what stimuli to allow, which is ultimately due to the
complexity of the relationship between human cognition and the
number of elements that make up a trademarked product. To
analyze how courts have treated survey stimuli, this Part examines
the doctrine of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which has
dealt extensively with the issue.70
1. The Creation of the Toys "R" Us Test
In determining the validity of surveys used in the trademark
context, the Second Circuit has widely adopted the test set out in
Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. CanarsieKiddie Shop, Inc.,7" in which the court
enjoined the use of the name "Kids 'r' Us." In Toys "R" Us, the
court determined that for a survey to be trustworthy, the party
presenting the survey must provide
evidence that (1) the 'universe' was properly defined, (2) a
representative sample of that universe was selected, (3) the
questions to be asked of interviewees were framed in a clear,
precise and non-leading manner, (4) sound interview
procedures were followed by competent interviewers who had
no knowledge of the litigation or the purpose for which the
survey was conducted, (5) the data gathered was accurately
reported, (6) the data was analyzed in accordance with
accepted statistical principles and (7) objectivity of the entire
process was assured.72
The court further explained that "[f]ailure to satisfy one or more
of these criteria may lead to exclusion of the survey ' 7 ' and that
"[t]he necessary foundation will normally be laid through the
69 For a discussion of control stimuli and related cases, see Edelman, supra note 64, at
405-17. See also Rappeport, supra note 62, at 987 (stating that if "a control stimulus is so
different that no respondent would ever guess [an association with the plaintiffs original
product], even when it is the only stimulus shown, then such a control cannot measure
whether people are guessing with response to the stimulus of actual interest .... ").
70 See supra note 22 and accompanying text for an explanation of why the Second
Circuit specifically was chosen for this analysis. For a discussion of how the Ninth Circuit
has treated some of the elements discussed in this article that does not focus on the
question of suney stimuli, see Robert H. Thornburg, Trademark Survey Evidence: Review of
Current Trends in the Ninth Circuit, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 715
(2005).
71 Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
72 Id. at 1205 (citations omitted).
73 Id.
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testimony of the persons responsible for the various parts of the
survey.74 The subsequent trademark-related cases in the Second
Circuit either directly cited the Toys "R" Us test or employed
substantially similar factors that demanded a proper sample,
survey content, and procedure. The issue of a researcher's choice
of the appropriate survey stimulus has received frequent scrutiny
in the Second Circuit's trademark jurisprudence and has
sometimes had a significant impact on a court's evaluation of a
survey's overall trustworthiness.
To evaluate the court's
understanding of survey content and decide whether it has been
consistent, it is most helpful to begin by dividing the main cases
that have explicitly discussed survey stimuli into two groups: those
that courts in the Second Circuit have deemed acceptable and
those that they have not.
2. Survey Stimuli Accepted by the Second Circuit"
a. Surveys Employing the Product Itself or an Image Thereof
Almost all of the surveys that courts in the Second Circuit
have considered reliable in trademark infringement cases have
used either the allegedly infringing product itself or an image of
the infringing product as the stimulus that was presented to
subjects. These cases involved a great diversity of products, and
courts approved of surveys that, for example, showed pictures of
various company signs including that of an allegedly infringing
pharmaceutical company;" a photograph of an allegedly
infringing revolver with all markings in plain view;77 "a color
photograph of... [an allegedly infringing] knife accompanied by
a catalogue-styled heading that read '11-Function Swiss Army
knife' and was followed by a description of the knife";7 ' a line-up of

74

Id.

75 Some, but not all, of the surveys mentioned in this Subpart were used in jury trials.

These surveys are all valuable in understanding judges' reasoning concerning survey
stimuli. This article, therefore, will not make the distinction for each case.
76 Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994). In Sterling Drug, an
American pharmaceutical company was suing a German pharmaceutical company for
infringing on the "Bayer" trademark by creating several types of consumer confusion as to
the affiliation between the two companies. The question accompanying the photographs
in the survey asked "[w] hat type of product or products, if any, are made by the company
or companies mentioned in the sign." Id. at 741 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77 New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.
Conn. 2004) (involving a trademark and trade dress infringement suit between a firearm
manufacturer and its competitor). The court emphasized that the survey appropriately
"focuses on direct perception of the marks, even if through photographs." Id. at 224-25.
78 Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 904 F. Supp. 1409, 1426-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1995). Forschnerpitted an importer of pocket knives from Switzerland, designated as
"Swiss Army Knives," against a distributor of knives made in China, who was accused of
misrepresentation of origin and false advertising.
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six cans of condensed milk including the plaintiff's product and
the defendant's competing and allegedly infringing product; 79 a
popcorn product sold in champagne bottles alleged to infringe on
a champagne manufacturer's trademark;"° a plaintiffs nail polish
bottle in a survey seeking to demonstrate that the bottle design
had acquired secondary meaning;"' garments carrying defendant's
allegedly infringing logo; 2 a photograph of defendant's blue
"Metbank" logo and a similar blue logo with the control mark
"MetroBank";83 a picture of the defendant's cigar products; 4
images of jeans on videotape, including allegedly infringing jeans
as eliciting probative value to show the similarity of the litigating
parties' jeans-stitching patterns. 5 Finally, the court in Lon Tai
Shing Co. v. Koch + Lowys6 permitted a survey in which a "mystery
shopper" went to lamp stores and showed salesmen one of three
different photographs-the plaintiffs lamp, the defendant's lamp,
or a control lamp. 7 The court explained that the advantage of
this type of study "is that it most closely approximates real market
conditions." 8
79 Friesland Brands, B.V. v. Vietnam Nat'l Milk Co., 221 F. Supp. 2d 457, 459-61
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
80 Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(allowing survey evidence of actual confusion between the plaintiffs trademark "Cuvee
Dom Perignon" and the popcorn "Dom Popingnon" sold in champagne bottles with a
similar label).
81 Essie Cosmetics, Ltd. v. Dae Do Int'l, Ltd., 808 F. Supp. 952, 955 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
82 PRL U.S.A. Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Polo Ass'n, Inc., No. 99-CV-10199, 2006 WL
1881744, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.July 7, 2006).
83 MetLife, Inc. v. Metro. Nat'l Bank, 388 F. Supp. 2d 223, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The
survey found that significantly more people believed that plaintiff Metlife owned or
sponsored "MetBank" (38%) than the control company "MetroBank" (4%). Id. at 233.
84 Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399, 2004 WL 602295, at
*26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004), rev'd in part, 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 2887 (2006).
85 Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 869 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
86 Lon Tai Shing Co. v. Koch + Lowy, No. 90 Civ. 4464, 1991 WL 170734 (S.D.N.Y.
June 20, 1991).
87 Id. at *17-18.
88 Id. at *19. A number of surveys have been rejected on grounds other than their
stimuli. Thus, while it is uncertain whether they would have been admitted had it not
been for other flaws, these surveys provide further evidence of the fact that trademark
surveys tend to use visual stimuli. See, e.g., Starter Corp. v. Converse, 170 F.3d 286, 296-97
(2d Cir. 1999) (using five brands of athletic shoes as stimuli); Mastercard Int'l Inc. v. First
Nat'l Bank of Omaha, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 3691, 2004 WL 326708, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23,
2004) (where a stimulus consisting of "a general information page, a description of the
smart card program, and a prototype of a 'OneSmart Mastercard"' in a survey, sought to
show that the ONESMART mark would not be confused with the SMART ONE mark);
Medical Econ. Co. v. Prescribing Reference, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d 456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(stimuli consisting of the plaintiffs, the defendant's, and a control actual publication
product); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (allegedly infringing jeans with all labelings as stimulus); Weight Watchers Int'l,
Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259, 1272-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (allegedly infringing
print advertisement used as stimulus in both plaintiffs and defendant's surveys); Dreyfus
Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1116 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stimuli
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In all of these cases, researchers showed subjects either the
product itself or a picture that displayed the product in an
unaltered condition.
The way in which the stimulus was
presented, as well as the setting in which it was shown, varied from
study to study. Courts thus gave a lot of latitude to researchers in
how to define the market conditions external to the stimulus itself:
the Lon Tai Shing court approved of researchers' decision to
conduct surveys in stores themselves, but this was by no means a
requirement for the manner in which to show a stimulus. It
appears that courts have placed great value on the stimulus choice
itself by using it as such a strong proxy of market conditions. This
judicial attitude appears rather sensible at first blush: after all,
people will encounter a particular product in a variety of settings,
and it is thus more important whether a stimulus truly represents a
product than what the particular surroundings of a study happen
to be. It is a bit worrisome, however, to accept as a given that the
surroundings must have been "representative enough." As will
become apparent in Part III.A.2, courts have set some limits to the
environmental cues that subjects may receive while viewing
stimuli. It remains unclear in many cases that have included
judicially approved surveys, however, whether courts examined the
issue of external cues at all.
b. The Great Exception: The McBagels Phone Survey
The main case that admitted a survey despite its lack of a
stimulus consisting of or resembling the product is McDonald's
Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc. 9 In McBagel's, the court accepted a phone
survey through which the plaintiff, McDonald's, sought to
establish trademark infringement.9" The defendants criticized the
survey for "ignoring market conditions, since it failed to include a
reference to defendant's 'bagel bakery restaurant' as advertised in
print with the name 'McBAGEL's', or to the different typeface
defendants use in print advertising."9 1 The court responded that
"[a]lthough the survey did not replicate the parties' print
advertising, by soliciting audio responses it was closely related to
the radio advertising involved in the case."9 2
The McBagel's case has little in common with the previously
discussed ones. Its study's failure to present subjects with visual
stimuli creates several problems. If one considers the average

consisting of corporate symbols, including the allegedly infringing lion symbol).
89 McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
90 Id. at 1277-78.
91 Id.

92 Id. at 1278.
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person's strong reliance on vision in his daily life, one cannot help
but wonder whether a customer standing in front of a McBagel's
bakery and viewing its sign, which purportedly did not resemble
McDonald's sign, would still be confused enough to enter the
bakery, mistaking it for a McDonald's affiliate.9 3 Refusing to
display a visual stimulus also exacerbates the problem of external
cues because researchers do not know what their study subjects
happened to be viewing at the time-it could have been a wall, a
McDonald's advertisement, or any number of other things. The
judge's explanation concerning the link between radio advertising
and the telephone study is unconvincing and provides a lot of
confusion for prospective researchers by blurring the boundaries
of the definition of the marketplace. The situation might have
presented itself differently if subjects had heard McBagel's radio
advertisements and then ordered McBagel's products over the
phone. In that case, only auditory stimuli and communication
would have existed throughout, with no other factors offsetting
the potential confusion from auditory stimuli.94
3.

Survey Stimuli Rejected by the Second Circuit

a. Improper Stimuli and Improper Questions
A large number of studies have been rejected for failing to
employ an appropriate stimulus, or, as a related matter, proper
questions. In the often-cited Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo
Co. case,95 a telephone survey failed, inter alia, to "connect Donkey

93 It is not necessarily the case that there would even have been so-called "initial
interest" confusion for a hypothetical customer standing in front of a McBagel's bakery.
94 Over the years, several courts have had to decide trademark infringement cases
relating to the "McDonald's" trademark. McDonald's has generally succeeded in winning
such litigations regarding products related to foods, as well as those related to other
products. See, e.g.,J &J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald's Corp., 932 F.2d 1460 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (disallowing registration of the trademarks "McPretzel" and "McDugal McPretzel"
due to likelihood of confusion with the family of marks owned by McDonald's);
McDonald's Corp. v. Druck & Gerner, DDS., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D.N.Y. 1993)
(enjoining defendant dentists from using the name "McDental"); Quality Inns Int'l v.
McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 211 (D. Md. 1988) (stating that "McDonald's golden
arches and the McDonald's logo rank among the strongest marks, enjoying instant
recognition among virtually all members of our society" and enjoining the use of the
name "McSleep"); McDonald's Corp. v. McKinley, 1989 WL 274414, at *6 (TTAB Sept. 25,
1989) (holdinfy that "applicant's use of MCTEDDY for teddy bears is likely to cause
confusion as to source in view of oposer's long use of its heavily advertised and
consequently well-known 'MC' and 'MAC' 'family of marks' on a variety of goods,
including toys."). Courts' suspicion of product names beginning with "Mc" in these cases
may suggest that the McBagel's court gave a lot of weight to the survey in part because of
the generally strong case that McDonald's is perceived to have in the trademark context.
In the author's view, one cannot reconcile the outcome of McBagel's with the rest of
Second Circuit doctrine and with common principles of survey construction. The court
should thus strike it down as bad law when a similar issue is next reviewed.
95 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co,, 746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Kong with Universal's alleged trademark in the name King Kong"
when it just asked participants: "To the best of your knowledge,
was the Donkey Kong game made with the approval or under the
authority of the people who produce the King Kong movies?" 96
The question was directly leading by suggesting a link between
"Donkey Kong" and "King Kong" rather than allowing subjects to
elicit answers themselves through open-ended questions such as
"Who do you think created the game Donkey Kong?" The lack of
a visual stimulus compounds the use of the leading question by
pushing subjects to respond in a desirably biased way, and thus
even high response rates, which generally indicate potential
confusion, are unconvincing.
The Universal City Studio case,
however, did not reject phone surveys outright.
b. Lack of a Visual Stimulus
Courts have rejected surveys for failing to use stimuli: "such as
pictures, advertisements or clothing, that directly expose potential
consumers to the products or the marks in question";9 7 "that would
inform consumers as to the competing products or marks in
question";" that should consist of "pictures or advertisements that
96 Id. at 118. Unlike the court in Universal City Studios, the court in Smithkline Beckman
Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 591 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), authorized the use of a
phone survey, but its sole purpose was to study consumer awareness of the brand name
"Ecotrin," and not to establish infringement. Id. at 1237-38.
97 Trouble v. Wet Seal, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 291, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (concerning an
infringement lawsuit by clothes seller and owner of the trademark "Agnes b." against the
owner of the trademark "Arden B") (citations omitted). The court also criticized the
questions used in the survey:
The auestions in the surveys included questions such as, "Do you think that
'Arden B.' clothing is made and sold by a company that makes or sells any other
line of clothing?" and "Do you think the company that makes and sells 'Arden
B.' clothing is affiliated, associated or connected with any other women's
clothing company?" Rather than test a consumer's confusion, these auestion[s]
test their awareness of other lines of clothing and company affiliation. If an
interviewee spontaneously answered 'Avns b.' to the second Question, there
would be some evidence of confusion. But contrary to the assertions the
survey's author ....
the fact that the maioity of interviewees answered "no" to
the second question does little to establish that they would not be confused if
they encountered both marks.
Id. at 308 n.12. On a related note, the same court found a survey unacceptable that
presented subjects with a blouse and skirt with the "Notorious" trademark as well as a
fragrance bottle and its carton with the allegedly infringing mark of the same name, and
asked the participants if they thought the two products were made by the same or a
different company; the court specifically criticized that "the side-by-side alignment of the
products is a somewhat unrealistic simulation of actual market conditions." Edison Bros.
Stores Inc. v. Cosmair Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1547, 1558-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
98 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(involving a suit in which the owner of a website and mark sought to enjoin a competitor'
and a software company from delivering competitive pop-up advertisements to computer
users), rev'd on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 749. The
decision mentioned that "[t]ypically, trademark infringement surveys use stimuli, such as
pictures, advertisements or clothing, that directly expose potential consumers to the
products or the marks in question." Id. (quoting Wet Seal 179 F. Supp. 2d at 308).
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approximate what a potential customer would encounter in
making her television-viewing choices";9 9 that would correspond to
actual products containing the disputed term rather than just a
card with the term written on it;0 0 and that would present a visual
rather than just aural representation of the covers of magazines
alleged to display infringing material.''
In the recent case
Additionally, the court criticized some of the questions used in the survey:
Question 4-2 reads, "I believe that anyone should have the right to place 'PopUp' advertisements on any website at any time, even if the owner of the website
does not authorize or approve it".
Bv suggesting in the second clause that
the pop-up ads might be unauthorized, [thel survey suggests that they should
not be permitted on the website. Question 4-5 reads: "I believe that 'Pop-Up'
advertisements are sometimes not sponsored by or authorized by the website on
which they appear." However, Question Nine reads: "Were you aware that,
when viewing websites on the Internet, SaveNow software causes 'Pop-Up'
advertisements to be displayed on your computer which are not authorized by
the website on which they appear?" ...
Since Question Nine flatly states that
poo-up ads generated by SaveNow software are unauthorized, the survey itself
suggests the answer to Question 4-5.
1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 500 n.54 (citations omitted). The court concluded
that the survey did not provide evidence of actual confusion and was of "weak probative
value in establishing the likelihood of initial interest confusion," which "weighs in favor of
neither Defendant nor Plaintiff." Id. at 501.
99 WE Media, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 218 F. Supp. 2d 463, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(involving a suit where a media company sued cable television channel producers for
trademark infringement and dilution).
100 Juicy Couture, Inc. v. L'Oreal U.S.A., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 7203, 2006 WL 1012939, at
*25 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2006) (involving a suit by the owner of marks such as 'Juicy," "Juicy
Couture," "Choose Juicy," etc. and the allegedly infringing owner of 'Juicy Wear," "Juicy
Pop," and 'juicy Pop Gossip").
101 Inc. Publ'g Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (pitting the publisher of a business magazine against a competitor in a trademark
infringement suit). Specifically, the court stated:
The respondents in a telephone survey are responding only to aural stimuli; in
layman's language, to the sounds of names. But we are concerned with
magazines. The covers of magazines are seen. The contents of magazines are
read. Such activities give rise to visual and cerebral stimuli. They play no part in
a telephone survey such as the one at bar.
Id. at 393; accord Penta Hotels Ltd. v. Penta Tours, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1081, 1104-05 (D. Conn.
1988) (dismissing a survey for its suggestive question: "Do you feel that there is some
connection between Penta Hotels and Penta Tours or do you feel that there is no
connection between these companies[,]" and stating that "[t]he use of a telephone in
conducting the survey here does not make it inherently deficient, although the court
recognizes that respondents were unable to view the parties' logos through the telephone
and thus the survey is not valid on the issue of similarity of the logos."). The court in
ManhattanMagazine also criticized the questions used in the survey:
Under question 3a, the interviewer says this over the telephone to the
respondent: Now I'm going to read the names of five magazines. Please listen to
the names of these magazines and tell me if any of these magazines sound to
you as if they might have the same publisher." The interviewer then read the
names of the following five magazines: "Business Week"; "Fortune"; "Inc.";
"Money Magazine"; and "Manhattan, inc." . . . . The interviewer then asked:
"Now, do any of the magazines Ijust mentioned sound as if they might have the
same publisher?" The respondent was asked to respond "yes" or "no." The
interviewer then moved to question 3b, and said: "Which magazines sound to
you as if they might have the same publisher?" ... The interviewer then posed
question 3c: "Why do the magazines you mentioned sound as if they might have
the same publisher?... On question 4a, the interviewer said to the respondent:
"I'm going to read the list of magazines one more time. This time please tell me
if any of these magazines sound to you as if they might contain similar types of
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Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc. °2 mentioned in the
Introduction, °" the plaintiff conducted a phone survey in which it
asked people to "name any company or store that [they] think
might offer a product called 'Charbucks."" 4 The court explained
that, in addition to the fact that only a small percentage of
individuals named 'Starbucks' as the answer, "in light of the fact
that the survey item was administered by telephone and did not
present the term 'Charbucks' in the linguistic or visual context
which Defendant uses it, this evidence is insufficient to make the
actual confusion factor weigh in Plaintiff's favor to any significant
degree." ' 5
Standing alone, the above-mentioned examples would seem
to suggest fairly clearly that visual stimuli are required, but the
Second Circuit's lack of complete bans on phone surveys prevents
one from drawing this conclusion. Note that phone surveys are
not always conducted with nefarious motives of eliciting bias: they
are often simply less expensive and faster than in-person
interviews.
With the advent of the Internet, however, their
justifiability is likely to decrease. Internet studies are able to
present both accurate pictures and sounds and prevent the survey
noise that can always arise from the particular interaction between
a researcher and a subject (whether that interaction happens on
the phone or in person).
Internet surveys will, however,
presumably still present problems in some cases due to their
remoteness from the environment in which a product sale would
06
occur.
c. Visual Stimuli Altered from the Original
In American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co.,"0 7 an older
case that involved a dispute about the trademark "Bionic," the

articles and information" . . . . For question 5, the interviewer asked the
respondent the following: "Do you think Manhattan, inc. magazine might be a
regional version of Inc. magazine?" The three recorded answers were "yes,"
"no," or "don't know." The questionnaire then concluded with eleven questions
for "classification purposes," dealing with work, work title, education, age,
income and the like.
ManhattanMagazine, 616 F. Supp. at 391.
102 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., No. 01-Civ-5981, 2005 WL 3527126
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2005).
103 See supra Part 1.
104 Starbucks Corp., 2005 WL 3527126, at *5 (citation omitted).
105 Id. It is not entirely clear from the judge's formulation whether he decided to admit
the survey and did not lend it much weight or whether he did not even think it should be
admitted. This may, however, largely constitute a semantic difference without much
consequence as to the outcome.
106 For a discussion of when Internet surveys would be appropriate, see infra Part IV.
107 Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1979).

1050

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

[Vol. 24:1027

court rejected two surveys for improper questions and stimuli." 8
The first survey was a telephone study that asked individuals: "With
whom or what do you associate a product labelled Bionic?"
According to the court, the survey should have asked: "With whom
or what do you associate a 'Bionic' boot?""° The second survey
showed participants an American promotional poster for the
"Bionic Boot" and asked them: "With whom or what do you
associate the term Bionic Boot?" The court rejected this survey
because the poster had been modified from the original poster
displayed at various shoe fairs in that references to American
Footwear as the seller of the boot had been removed." 0 The court
raised similar concerns in Jaret International, Inc. v. Promotion in
Motion,"' where a manufacturer of sour candy accused a
competitor of trade dress infringement." 2 The court rejected the
plaintiffs survey, because, among other reasons, "there is no
dispute that either SOUR PATCH KIDS or SOUR JACKS
purchasers would ever purchase these products without the full
marks on the boxes, the survey technique of removing portions of
them is suspect."".. The court came to the same conclusion in a
case involving two food distributors in which the plaintiff's survey
did not use plaintiffs complete trademark "Vista Food Exchange,
Inc." with its corresponding flag logo but rather only the word
"Vista" in the brochure that survey respondents viewed before they
were asked what company produced the brochure."4 Finally, in
Revlon Consumer Products Corp. v. Jennifer Leather Broadway, Inc.," 5
the court criticized the fact that the plaintiff's survey "only tested
consumers' reactions to the black and white newspaper version of
defendant's advertisement.
[The plaintiffs survey] made no
attempt to study the subway version of the advertisement which
depicted the couches in nine different colors.""06
It is interesting to see that the Second Circuit deems the use
of imperfect visual stimuli in these cases as worse than using no
visual stimulus at all, such as in a phone study. Removing
significant portions of visual stimuli is thus never acceptable,
108 Id. at 660.
109 Id.
110 Id.
"' Jaret Int'l, Inc. v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
112 Id.at 73-74.
113 Id. (stating that the survey "has the same methodological defect as the one cited in
American Footwear').
114Vista Food Exch., Inc. v. Vistar Corp., No. 03-CV-5203, 2005 WL 2371958, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
115 Revlon Consumer Prods. Corp. v. Jennifer Leather Broadway, Inc., 858 F. Supp.
1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
116Id. at 1275. The court also mentions that one of the Questions in the survey was:
"Do you think Revlon is in any way associated withJennifer Leather?" Id. at 1276.
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because it becomes a selective tool that manipulates and biases
subjects. The underlying assumption is that some aspects of a
product may resemble another product, but that the resemblances
are offset by remarkable differences that cannot simply be
eliminated in a survey to produce a desired result. A truly
infringing product is one that elicits confusion in the actual
marketplace, which means that the similarities with another
product are so great that none of the variations make up for it.
d. Inappropriate Visual Control Stimuli
In Conopco, Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., the owner of a trademarked
perfume bottle alleged infringement and dilution by its
competitor.
The court rejected a survey that the plaintiff
conducted using the defendant's pre-launch bottle as a stimulus
rather than the one that consumers would eventually see in the
marketplace, and explained that "a survey must use the proper
stimulus, one that tests for confusion by replicating marketplace
conditions."" 8 This language was borrowed from Cumberland
Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 119 which held that a manufacturer of
artificial sweetener did not infringe upon its competitor's
trademark. 2 In a later decision, the court in Cumberland Packing
Corp. v. Monsanto Co.,1" 1 rejected a revised survey presented by the
plaintiff in part because it used improper, artificial-looking control
stimuli.'22 Similar to original stimuli that have been altered,
Conopco, Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Id. at 253-54.
119 Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
[hereinafter Cumberland, 1999].
120 Id. at 575.
121 Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
[hereinafter Cumberland,2001].
122 Specifically, the court stated:
The variations of the NutraSweet box, both light blue and the darker blue, with
the coffee cup removed are inappropriate and thoroughly unrealistic. When
the coffee cup was removed it was not replaced with any other graphic and every
other detail on the box was unchanged. In place of the coffee cup was a
conspicuous absence in the middle of the front panel. The sweetener packet,
tilted on angle so as to lean against a cup, was left tilting in a seemingly random
fashion. The results of the survey indicate that these two non-coffee cup
variations caused the lowest levels of confusion. This is hardly surprising. These
boxes look unauthentic and contrived. Comparing the confusion levels caused
by these two so-called controls to the other NutraSweet box variations cannot
result in any legally meaningful data.
Id. at 249. The Cumberland, 2001 court also stated: "The test is not whether the products
can or do create confusion in the abstract but whether that confusion affects the
purchasing and selling of the goods or services in question." Id. at 250 (citations
omitted). Survey subjects were asked the following Questions:
01. Please look at this box of aspartame-based sugar substitute as if you were
considering buving it. 02. Do you think that any of these sugar substitutes are
made by the same company that made the first box you saw? 03. Which one or
more of these sugar substitutes do you think are made by the same company as
117

118
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inappropriate control stimuli create bias by suggesting a particular
answer that may not correlate with confusion in the marketplace.
The Cumberland court also implicitly seems to have asked itself
whether a researcher with no specific result in mind would have
ever produced that survey. The unnatural displays of the control
sweetener packets in the survey made the court answer this
question in the negative. The same question was asked and
answered in the negative by the courts that decided the cases in
which visual stimuli were altered from the original by removing
product packaging markings and the like.'2 3 In another case, the
court found that the plaintiff owner of "Ice Breakers," who was
suing the owner of "Dentyne Ice," should have employed a control
product other than "Trident" because "[a]lthough Trident is a
gum product, it fails to capture the essence of the allegedly
confusing quality at issue, namely the 'Ice' term or some variation
of that theme." 2 4
e. Failure to Present Both the Original and
Allegedly Infringing Product
Courts have generally been unsympathetic toward parties that
presented surveys that did not utilize both the plaintiff's and the
defendant's product. In one case, the defendant's expert only
presented survey respondents with the defendant's literary
products rather than displaying the plaintiff's goods as well, which
the court found could have greatly underestimated the likelihood
of consumer confusion.125 In another instance, the court held that
a defendant's survey was flawed because it failed to display the
plaintiff's alcoholic product in addition to its own. 126 Thus, it is
safe to say that a survey seeking admission in the Second Circuit
should present both the plaintiff's and the defendant's marks.

the first box you saw? 04. Why do you say that? 05. If the respondent
mentioned color as a reason for thinkina that one of the sugar substitutes in the
second room was made by the same company that made the first box they saw
they were asked: When you say color or coloring, precisely what do you mean by
that?
Id. at 246-47.
123 See supraPart III.A.3.d.
124 Nabisco v. Warner-Lambert Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 690, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The court
also criticized the survey at bar for using advertisements for "Ice Breaker" and "Dentyne
Ice" rather than the products themselves. Id.
125 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Dove Audio, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 279, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(pitting the owner of the trademark "The Book of Virtues" against the maker of "The
Children's Books of Virtues" products).
126 Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4239, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23411, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2003) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc., 970 F. Supp. at 281
and holding in favor of the defendants despite their flawed survey evidence because the
plaintiff failed to produce any survey), affd, 412 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 2005).
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Compound Problems

A number of problems related to survey methodology
surfaced in Pilot Corp. v. Fisher-Price,Inc., 27 where the plaintiff sued
its former licensee for infringing upon the mark of the drawing
toy "Magna Doodle" by using the term "Doodle Pro." The court
criticized the plaintiffs survey for failing to show the actual
products rather than just their logos accompanied by a brief
description of the toys they designate; the survey only showed
parts of the Magna Doodle logo (without the words "The
Original," and the Magna Doodle Slogan, that accompany both
Magna Doodle products); and the survey failed to employ a
proper control stimulus by only using purple writing on a yellow
background to designate the two products in dispute without any
of the control items.'2 8 For these reasons, the court gave more
weight to the defendant's two surveys that did not contain these
29

flaws.1

The plaintiff and defendant in NationalDistillersProducts Co. v.
Refreshment Brands, Inc.,3 ' each presented a survey to determine
whether there was infringement of the "Teton Glacier" mark
associated with high quality vodka. The court rejected the
plaintiffs survey, mentioning the following among its
methodological errors:
First, the respondents were shown the Teton Glacier label on a
card, rather [than] on a bottle, as they would encounter the
label in the marketplace. Second, while the cooler bottles
would obviously be full when sold in the marketplace, they were
empty when shown to the subjects of the [plaintiffs]
Survey ....
The [defendant's] Survey, on the other hand, is
much more reliable because it more accurately approximates
actual market conditions. For example, subjects were not made
artificially aware of... the TETON GLACIER trademark. 3'
The defendant's survey, which employed a bottle and a four-pack
of the allegedly infringing product, and a bottle and four-pack of a

Pilot Corp. v. Fisher-Price Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Conn. 2004).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 358-59.
130 Nat'l Distillers Prods. Co. v. Refreshment Brands, 198 F. Supp. 2d 474 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). The questioning of subjects in the plaintiffs survey proceeded as follows:
In the first "room," the interviewer showed the subject the TETON GLACIER
label, without the bottle to which it is normally attached. Then, in the second
room, the subject was shown seven or eight empty cooler bottles and told,
"Some, all, or none of these alcoholic beverages may come from the same maker
or company as the product on the card I showed you [in the first room].
Which, if any, of these alcoholic beverages do you think come from the same
maker or company as the product on the card I showed you [in the first room]?"
Id. at 482-83 (footnote omitted).
131 Id. at 484 (footnote omitted).
127
128
129
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control product, was thus found to be acceptable. 3 2 While the
alteration of original visual stimuli has been discussed,1 33 the Teton
Glacier label presents a slightly different issue. Nobody claimed
that the label was altered, but only that it was presented on a card
rather than a bottle. In a number of cases that either accepted
visual stimuli 34 or mentioned that they should have been
present, 35 courts did not seem to differentiate between a product
itself and an accurate image thereof. One therefore puzzles over
whether the Teton Glacier card was problematic because it only
represented an image rather than a product, or rather because it
displayed the image of the label rather than of the entire bottle.
The former would not fit well with the other case law in the
Second Circuit; the latter is problematic as well because it is
unclear whether the problem is an issue of ex ante principle or
rather one of an ex post judgment made after having seen the
results of the defendant's study. This case illustrates, once more,
the problem of not providing clearer guidelines as to what types of
stimuli are and are not acceptable.
g. Environmental Cues
Courts have also paid attention to cues in the environment in
which surveys are conducted. In one case,'36 the district court
criticized a plaintiffs survey because "large signs bearing plaintiff's
logo were visible from some of the test sites or on the way to some
of the test sites."'3 7 In Hutchinson v. Essence Communications, Inc.," 8
a rap music performer sued for declaration of non-infringement
of trademark for use of the name "Essence" against the publisher
of Essence magazine. The court refused to give significant weight
to a survey that the defendant commissioned. 9 One of the
criticisms mentioned in the case is that survey participants could
Id. at 483-84. The defendant's survey used the following ouestioning:
The subjects were shown either the Arctic Bay or Glacier Bay products and
permitted to examine them for as long as they wished. The products were then
taken away and the subjects were asked a series of Questions, to wit: "What
company or companies do you think makes or puts out this product?"; "Whether
you know the name of the company that makes this product, are you aware of
any other products or brands put out by this company?"; if yes, then, "What
other products or brands do you think are put out by the company that makes
this product?"; and "If you have an opinion, do you think that the company that
makes this product did or did not get approval or permission from any other
company or companies in order to put out this product?"
Id. at 483.
133 See supra Part III.A.3.d.
134 See supra Part III.A.2.a.
135 See supra Part III.A.3.c.
136 Exxon Corp. v. XOIL Energy Res., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
137Id. at 1022.
138 Hutchinson v. Essence Commc'ns, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
132

139 Id. at

557-65.
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possibly see a copy of Essence magazine during the interview, which
may have influenced their answers.140 Of further interest is the
Hutchinson court's explanation of why Hutchinson should be
distinguished from McBagel's. Notably, the court explains that
"restaurants are often franchises; singers rarely are. Thus, it is
more likely that the question did not plant an idea in the minds of
the interviewees in the restaurant context than in this context,
'
given the judicially noticeable prevalence of restaurant chains." 41
This explanation is far from convincing, especially because it does
not seem to stem from any empirical evidence.
It showed,
however, that the court was unwilling to overrule McBagel's and
thus still considered it good law.
h. Leading Brands
In Mennen Co. v. Gillette Co.,142 a manufacturer of deodorants
and antiperspirants sought to prevent the defendant competitor
from using a diagonal stripe design on its packaging. The court
rejected the use of a survey said to be "fatally defective and
untrustworthy in a number of ways" and explained:
In this survey, respondents were shown the Mennen stripes and
asked: "Please look at this picture and this list of stick
deodorant brand names. Among the leading brands of stick
deodorants now on the market, which of the brands listed here
would you say uses these stripes on their package?" The
respondents were then shown a list of manufacturers. While
63% of the respondents selected Mennen from the array, this
was merely a playback of brand share in response to a highly
suggestive, aided question, in which respondents most likely
pointed to Mennen as it was the major producer of stick
deodorants.14
Similarly, in Pfizer Inc. v. Astra PharmaceuticalProds., Inc.,144 the
court rejected a finding of secondary meaning on the basis of a
survey that sought to establish that defendant's drug TOPROL XL
infringed on plaintiffs mark PROCARDIA XL. In that case, a
survey asked: "Thinking of the practice of cardiovascular
medicine, what first comes to mind when you hear the letters
XL?"1 5 The court explained:
It is not probative of secondary meaning that physicians
conditioned (or asked) to respond with a drug name
Id.at 565.
Id.
Mennen Co. v. Gillette Co., 565 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
143 Id. at 652.
144 Pfizer Inc. v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
145 Id. at 1321.
140
141
142
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responded with one of the most popular, if not the most
popular, cardiovascular drug on the market and the only XLbrand having significant presence in the market at the
suffixed
46
time. 1
Why this logic was not also used in McBagel's is unclear. Generally,
such reasoning appears to prevent large brands from artificially
entrenching themselves by using their status difference in leading
questions. It has been suggested that certain types of survey
questions, including the type that require subjects to identify a
company that makes a potentially infringing product, overestimate
"the likelihood of consumer confusion about the sources of
products and the extent of consumer confusion that can validly be
attributed to similarity in the names, sounds, and appearances of
consumer goods or services" and show "that the demand effects of
obtrusive questioning create major response 47bias and distortion
that favor the well-known brand or company.'
This category of surveys particularly highlights the
fundamental problem of failing to provide ex ante standards for
stimuli and questions. A lot of money must have been spent on
conducting these surveys-whether the researchers intentionally
usurped the big brand status of their clients is not entirely clearand the whole issue could have been avoided had the court
provided better guidelines beforehand.'48 Even after these cases,
future researchers may only have a few more leads as to what types
of questions to avoid when dealing with major brands, but nothing
will prevent them from making slightly different mistakes.
i.

Business Associations Through Similar Names

In Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 149 the plaintiff
claimed that "defendants' use of the name 'Beneficial' is likely to
cause confusion as to the source of defendants' services and to
induce the public to deal with defendants in the mistaken belief
that the services offered by defendants are in fact those of
plaintiffs.' 15' The court stated:
To the key question asked by the survey, "Do you think that
there may or may not be a business connection between
146

Id. at 1321-22.

147John P. Liefeld, How Surveys Overestimate the Likelihood of Consumer Confusion, 93

TRADEMARK REP. 939, 941 (2003). Cf A. David Morrow & Ruth M. Corbin, Pulling
Confusion Surveys Back from an Illusory Brink: Reply to an Article of Dr. John Liefeld, 94
TRADEMARK REP. 1372, 1380-81 (2004) (disagreeing with Liefeld and claiming that the
bias toward better-known brands can be corrected through proper control conditions).
148 Such problems could have similarly been avoided if a court had declared the survey
improper on its face, as will be discussed infra Part IV.
149 Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F.Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y.1982).
150 Id. at 447.
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Beneficial Capital Corp. and the Beneficial Finance System
Companies?" thirty-one percent of the respondents stated that
such a connection was either definite or probable. This
evidence is of little probative value, however. First: the question
framed has a "leading" quality, not well suited to eliciting an
uninfluenced reaction from the persons questioned .... The

survey establishes no more than that the names are similar, a
factor as to which there can be little genuine dispute in any
event, and that portions of the general public will make the
reasonable assumption, that, in the absence of any other
information, two companies15 with similar names are likely to
have a business connection. 1
The issue of business relationships is a tricky one. After all, we do
want to know whether potential customers falsely believe that
there is a connection between, for instance, a less reputable and a
more reputable company or product. Yet, as mentioned earlier,
similarities in names can be offset by differences that will eliminate
confusion. Consumers would also probably be more aware in the
marketplace that brand names both containing a generic word
(such as here the word "beneficial") are not necessarily linked.
The Beneficial Corp. court's refusal to accept a leading question is
intuitively sensible, but it once again shows the dangers in the
current judicial approach to trademark surveys that wastes
resources and time. In the end, while the evidence here was
insufficient for a showing of confusion, it is troublesome that one
cannot conclusively state what degree of confusion actually exists
in the marketplace, which can potentially have negative
repercussions for consumers.
B. Summary of Second CircuitDoctrine RegardingSurvey Contents
and Formats
The majority of acceptable surveys used a visual stimulus that
consisted either of the product itself or of an unaltered depiction
of the product. Courts also expect surveys to present both the
original and the allegedly infringing product, rather than just one
of these, while allowing for a variety of settings in which the
surveys could take place. It is questionable whether the main
exception to the visual stimulus rule, the survey in McBagel's,
would be found acceptable if the case were to be decided today.
The McBagel's case will hopefully remain an outlier in survey
doctrine, but its existence raises the important point that we
151 Id. at 450-51; accord Franklin Res., Inc. v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 988 F. Supp.
322, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a finance company that used the name
"Franklin Credit" did not infringe upon the trademark of a mutual fund company that
used the name "Franklin").
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cannot be certain of how an identical case would be decided until
courts set a clearer standard for what constitutes an acceptable
stimulus. The case has neither been overruled nor has there been
any statement on the part of courts that surveys should, for
instance, presumptively include as much visual, auditory, and
other information as possible to establish confusion.
The Second Circuit has not only failed to state a presumptive
standard for survey stimuli but also compounded the problem by
failing to state such a standard for control stimuli or the presence
of particular environmental cues. Nonetheless, there have been
surveys that were struck down for lack of a proper control stimulus
or a biasing set of environmental cues. The same is true for the
form of survey questions: courts have condemned leading
questions, but have not always explained what makes a question
leading.
The legal situation of trademark surveys thus rests on an
uneasy foundation. There are some indications of measures that
researchers can take to make a survey more likely to succeed, such
as using the actual product as a stimulus. No survey, however, is
guaranteed to succeed, regardless of how carefully prepared or
how meticulously it attempts to reproduce those surveys that have
been deemed acceptable in the Second Circuit. At the same time,
conducting a survey is not a zero-cost game. Not only do experts,
subjects, materials, and localities cost a great deal of money, 2 but
there is also often no more than one chance for a litigant to
conduct a proper survey. Failure to do so can mean losing the
entire case. Nonetheless, there is little reason to take a defeatist
perspective* on the current situation.
Clearly, trademark
infringement is an area with fuzzy boundaries and no test may
perfectly capture "true" infringement. At the same time, courts
could take both procedural and substantive corrective measures to
remedy the present situation and thus provide the needed
guidance to conduct proper surveys and serve the interests of
152 One figure suggests that these surveys can cost from $30,000 to $150,000.
See
William E. Gallagher & Ronald C. Goodstein, Inference Versus Speculation in Trademark
Infringement Litigation: Abandoning the Fiction of the Vulcan Mind Meld, 94 TRADEMARK REP.
1229, 1241 n.30 (2004) (citing Keith M. Stolte, RemedyingJudicialLimitations on Trademark
Surveys: Monetary Relief Should Not Require Proofof Actual Confusion, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 229,
249-50 (1997)). Gallagher and Goodstein discuss whether these high costs should affect
judicial requirements of such surveys and conclude:
Regardless of the Position with which one may sympathize, it does not advance
the inquiry of whether there is a likelihood of confusion in any Particular case.
It is a matter of Policy. If court decisions move the state of the law toward a
greater demand for empirical or scientific evidence in cases where the
circumstantial evidence is not strong, any unfairness to trademark owners with
limited litigation resources is a matter for legislation, not limitations on
advancement of decisional law.
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justice.
IV. A NEW MODEL FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT SURVEYS
As demonstrated, the status of the legal standards
surrounding trademark surveys is quite shaky. This Part of the
article will argue that a number of steps could improve the
existing situation dramatically.
First, the current procedural
manner in which courts handle trademark surveys should be
changed either by having the court itself (through a legislative
amendment to the Lanham Act) or the PTO, which currently
handles trademark registration, pre-clear surveys before they are
conducted. Second, courts need to provide substantive guidance
for their expectations, which should include survey rules that
would need to be rebutted with specific evidence. An alternative
to the latter idea would consist of Congress amending the Lanham
Act to include stricter substantive requirements for trademark
litigation, but, as explained below,'53 courts are probably in a
better position to implement changes directly.
A. The ProceduralHandlingof Trademark Surveys
Currently, the typical procedure for cases involving
trademark surveys roughly works as follows: the plaintiff sues the
defendant for a violation of the plaintiffs trademark.
The
plaintiff hires a researcher or company specialized in conducting
trademark-related surveys. 154 Sometimes the defendant himself
also commissions a survey to actively disprove the claims of
consumer confusion. If the legal case, rather than settling early
on, actually goes to trial, a "battle of the experts" tends to ensue.
Each side uses experts to defend its own survey while attacking any
surveys the other side may have produced. The court must then
decide which survey will be admissible, if any. By this point, any
mistakes in survey design can be fatal and may not be corrected.
Such mistakes can stem from surveyors having attempted to bias
subjects a certain way, but errors can also arise out of benign
See infra Part IV.B.
A number of companies now engage in the lucrative business of conducting
trademark surveys. See, e.g.,
Trademark Infringement Litigation Services, APPLIED MARKETING
SCIENCE, INC., http://www.ams-inc.com/litigation/trademark.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2006) (offering services to establish trademark or trade dress infringement).
The
company claims:
AMS understands the legal standards for survey research in litigation. We know
how to develop questions that are not leading or biased, how to derive valid
measurements of confusion, and how to develop stimuli that are truly
representative of actual purchase or post-purchase situations. Our 15 years of
interviewing customers in dozens of industries have helped us understand the
customer mindset, enabling us to "crawl into the minds of consumers."
153
154
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motives, such as confusion about existing court standards. One
could imagine an alternative system in which the court is involved
with the surveys at an earlier stage. Survey scholar Phyllis Welter
has suggested that perhaps courts should appoint a third, neutral
expert instead of, or in addition to, the parties' experts.'5 5 Welter
quotes Judge Richard Posner, who first proposed a similar idea, to
explain the reasons that require such a solution:
Many experts are willing for a generous (and sometimes for a
modest) fee to bend their science in the direction from which
their fee is coming. The constraints that the market in
consultant services for lawyers places on this sort of behavior
are weak, as shown by the fact that both experts in this case
were hired and, we have no doubt, generously remunerated
even though both have been criticized in previous judicial
opinions. The judicial constraints on tendentious expert
testimony are inherently weak because judges (and even more
so juries, though that is not an issue in a trademark case)' 56 lack
training or experience in the relevant fields of expert
knowledge. But that is the system we have.'57
As mentioned, however, it is unclear that potential surveyor bias is
the only or even the main problem.'5 8 There are no guarantees
155 PhyllisJ. Welter, A Call to Improve Trademark Survey Evidence, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 205
(1995).
156 For a brief discussion of the conditions for a jury trial and related trends, which
Posner mentions here in passing, see supra note 45. The Fourth Circuit has previously
stated that juries are particularly competent to resolve questions of likelihood of
confusion: "First, the jury, which represents a cross-section of consumers, is well-suited to
evaluating whether an 'ordinary consumer' would be likely to be confused. Second, the
likelihood of consumer confusion is an 'inherently factual' issue that depends on the
unique facts and circumstances of each case." 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 32:130
(citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted)).
157 Welter, supra note 155, at 205 (citing Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Bait. Football
Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410, 415 (1994)). Welter also states:
Those clients, the parties, while traditionally interested in saving time and
money, are also interested in reducing the risk of a losing position. A mediated
survey, done by a neutral court-appointed survey expert, should reduce the
overall cost of litigation, with less discovery and shared costs, and should also
reduce the risk of a "losing" position by providing an objective evaluation of the
market place.
Id. at 209-10.
158 It is difficult to estimate how many of the problems with survey evidence were
caused by researcher bias as opposed to other issues. Some judges have, however,
expressed specific concern about the issue of bias:
A universe that excluded whites entirely is one which reflects neither the market
for rap music generally nor for plaintiffs' music specifically. An all-black
universe reflects the readership of the magazine, not the listeners of rap; in
effect, the answers rendered by that universe are responding to the cuestion of
whether consumers of the magazine are likely to be confused. Only if whites are
included will the answers reflect whether consumers of rap performers are likely
to be confused. It is thus not a proper universe. Given the extensive testimony
about the powerful name recognition enioyed by ESSENCE Magazine amongst
blacks, the exclusion of whites was likely to bias the results in favor of the
magazine.
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that a neutral expert would necessarily produce a survey that
conforms to what courts want. While courts may, for better or for
worse, be more inclined to trust the judgment of a neutral expert,
his survey may still not fulfill certain expectations. Furthermore, it
has been noted that 'judges as well as lawyers want trials to be
predictable and controlled,"'5 9 a goal that the appointment of a
neutral expert would undermine. One scholar explains:
A court-appointed expert .

.

. is nobody's responsibility.

Preparation by the parties' attorneys will not have the usual
effect. They have no control over an appointed expert and are
likely to be suspicious of the entire enterprise, if not overtly
hostile, while the expert herself has no commitment to any one
party and will probably be reluctant to compromise her
neutrality by working too closely with either side. Worse, at
least some authorities believe that ex parte communications
between attorneys and court-appointed experts are improper.
This would mean that any pre-trial preparation by the attorneys
must take place (if at all) in the presence of the opposition-a
procedure American lawyers will shun.16
The scholar concludes that having a neutral expert would produce
a transformation of the adversarial system that would "threaten the
prerogatives of the trial attorneys"161 and produce wide-spread
opposition on the part of the bar16 as well asjudges, who are often
former trial attorneys themselves and consequently share some
similar sentiments.'6 3 Thus, while a system with neutral experts
presents certain advantages, it is unlikely to receive the necessary
amount of support from the legal community in any case.1
Some scholars have even suggested that there are distinct
advantages to having surveys specifically conducted by the plaintiff
and defendant. In their article about this exact issue,165 Ruth

Hutchinson v. Essence Commc'ns, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 541, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
159 Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1202 (1991).
160 Id. at 1203.
161 Id. at 1205.
162 Id. at 1197-98.
163 Id. at 1198.
164 Gross also mentions some problems that are specific to the court appointing
psychologists or psychiatrists, i.e., that "these are highly controversial areas for expert
evidence in any form, probably the most controversial subjects on which expert testimony
is routinely allowed," that "psychiatric and psychological expertise is . .. different from
other types of expertise and ...is inherently partisan," and that "in some jurisdictions in
which court-appointed psychiatrists and psychologists are used comparatively frequently,
they are typically chosen for reasons of convenience and economy rather than quality."
Id. at 1195. While Gross's discussion primarily appears to focus on the criminal law
context, these factors could cause at least partial problems in the trademark survey
context as well.
165 Ruth M. Corbin & Arthur Renaud, What's Good for the Goose Is Badfor the Gander: Why
Confusion Surveys for Plaintiff and Defendant Should Be Different, 16 INTELL. PROP. J. 177
(2003).
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Corbin and Arthur Renaud name a number of reasons defending
this status quo by focusing on Canadian case law but using
arguments equally applicable in the American context. Corbin
and Renaud note that the two parties must meet opposite
evidentiary burdens-plaintiffs must demonstrate likelihood of
confusion while defendants must demonstrate that there is
none-which calls for different survey formats for scientific and
statistical reasons.1 "6 In the end, "there are legitimate situations in
which each side's evidence is not contradictory, but differently
directed. It is then up to the Court to seek to understand what
each side's evidence demonstrates, and how each bears on the
issues at hand."'67 Corbin and Renaud also discredit the idea that
surveys are some sort of 'junk science" that demonstrate whatever
their creators wish them to."6 Rather, "the field of survey research
incorporates all the essential structural techniques of other
scientific expert evidence, including rigorous hypothesis testing,
experimental
design,
control
conditions, and statistical
inference,"69 and the scholars view it as an advantage that "lawyers
will have the opportunity to educate the court on what constitutes
proper statistical inference, as opposed to pseudo-science, in
defending their own survey strategy and criticizing the
opposition."'7 °
Despite these criticisms of neutral experts and defenses of the
status quo, an interesting aspect of Phyllis Welter's proposal 7 ' is
the idea of allowing judges to intervene before any survey is
conducted. One way to implement this idea would be to require
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.

at
at
at
at

182-84.

184.
178.
180.
170 Id. at 194. The piece also notes that judges in Canada, like in the United States,
have rejected trademark confusion claims altogether for failure to present trademark
evidence. Id. at 179. Another scholar states:
In a number of other countries, mostly in Europe for the time being, the
trademark bar is increasingly resorting to surveys. In Germany and the United
Kingdom, surveys are by now quite common, although some British judges still
regard them with a healthy dose of skepticism, if not hostility. In Sweden, the
Patent Office recently withdrew an objection of non-registrability following the
submission of survey evidence. In Austria, survey evidence is accepted both by
the Patent Office and the courts. The Finnish Supreme Court two years ago
decided the ADIDAS "three stripe" case on the basis of survey evidence.
Peter Weiss, The Use of Survey Evidence in Trademark Litigation: Science, Art or Confidence
Game?, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 71, 73 (1990) (footnotes omitted). Roland Knaak explains
that in Germany, judges can issue a court order demanding a survey if they feel that their
own experiences as consumers are insufficient to reach a result. Roland Knaak, The
InternationalDevelopment of Survey Practicesin Trademark and UnfairCompetition Law, 21 INT'L
REv. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 327, 331 (1990). Knaak further predicts that "it
appears unlikely that such [likelihood of confusion] surveys will be frequently applied in
the near future" due to the "complexity of the likelihood of confusion in its legal sense
and in its actual types." Id. at 343.
171 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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parties to submit survey proposals to the judge before conducting
the actual surveys. Without an argument between the parties,
judges could thus establish in advance if the survey was acceptable
on its face. This would require the court to look at the survey
questions, proposed setting, survey universe and the like, and to
make a preliminary decision about whether a particular survey
framework would ever be deemed acceptable. The reason this
would only constitute facial acceptability is that there could still be
methodological errors in implementation that would make the
survey unreliable.
It appears, however, that most of the surveys that were
rejected by the Second Circuit would have already been rejected at
this pre-trial stage, which would have given the relevant parties the
opportunity to improve the design until it directly met the court's
standards.
This includes, for instance, the survey in the
"Charbucks" case previously mentioned.'72 Considering the factspecific nature of trademark infringement law, judicial preclearance would produce an efficient way to ensure qualitatively
high research that would presumptively be approved by the court
before parties spend high sums of money on surveys. This idea
presents certain key advantages over Welter's model: it still allows
the parties to choose the experts they deem the most suitable and
ensures that most methodological mistakes will be caught at an
early stage. One potential criticism of pre-clearance of surveys is
that it could force judges to spend a lot of time examining several
versions of a survey. However, it appears that parties have little
incentive to "annoy" ajudge with too many versions and will try to
minimize their demands on him. This approach would also be
coupled with substantive guidelines'7 3 to reduce the strain on the
judicial system and encourage an efficient allocation of resources.
Procedurally, and resonating with Welter's thought, one
could establish these guidelines with the help of numerous,
neutral trademark survey experts that incorporate some very
general bright line rules to create a floor below which no survey
could presumptively fall if it is to be declared facially acceptable.
It is understood that social science will never become as exact as
other sciences, but a stated rule reasonably based on available,
albeit slightly inexact knowledge, may prove better than no rule at
all. Experts could still present empirical evidence of why the
subject they studied is so extraordinarily different as to merit the
While the empirical
rebuttal of the court's presumptions.
feasibility and precise outline of procedural changes remains to be
172
173

See supra Part I.
See infra Part IV.B.
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explored in further detail by future scholars, it is clear that it
should become one of the most important contexts in which to
consider improvement of the judicial treatment of surveys.
It also bears emphasis that certain elements of a survey, such
as survey stimuli, are particularly easy to subject to pre-trial judicial
scrutiny. 174
Researchers can submit to the court the exact
materials they are planning to use and courts can acquiesce to the
chosen stimulus, reject the selection, or ask for its modification in
a particular way. Hearings on these issues would be conducted
outside the presence of the jury to prevent prejudice. While the
court at this point only establishes facial admissibility and will
determine final admissibility of the survey later, the jury will still
need to evaluate the weight it chooses to lend to the survey. If a
survey does make its way to the jury after being deemed facially
acceptable, and if the court explains the procedure that permitted
this, juries will understand that the survey met a basic set of
criteria that correspond to the current state of social science
knowledge. Juries in different trademark infringement cases
would thus consider surveys that contain fairly homogenous basic
elements, which would ensure more equal treatment across
litigations. Knowing that they are examining a survey whose
questions, stimuli, and other founding blocks can be trusted
would allow juries to focus their attention on whether a facially
acceptable survey was also executed properly and, if so, how its
results fit with the totality of the evidence.
Alternatively, Congress could amend the Lanham Act to allow
the PTO to pre-clear surveys in an agency proceeding. The PTO
already possesses significant expertise in making decisions related
to questions of infringement because of its decision-making role in
the trademark registration process. When an individual seeks to
register a trademark, other parties who believe the registration
would damage them have the right to file an opposition to
registration with the PTO, after which an agency determination
decides the question. 75
Additionally, parties can file an
application with the PTO for cancellation of an already registered
mark. 176 Further investigation needs to be performed to quantify
the potential cost of PTO pre-clearance and the degree to which
the agency's operation would have to be modified before it could
fulfill this task. Until this data is available, judicial pre-clearance

174 In addition, survey elements such as control stimuli, question formulations,
definition of the survey universe, and others are also easy to subject to pre-trial judicial
scrutiny.
175 See 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (2006).
176 See id. § 1064.
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represents the most straightforward procedural change: while its
exact costs would still require investigation, the judicial system
would demand less extensive change to perform such a function. 77
B. Substantive Guidelinesfor Content-Related Issues
Would it not be useful if judges could agree on certain
minimal presumptive conditions that every survey must fulfill
before being admitted? Would it not be even better if courts
could elaborate and explain what these conditions are rather than
make experts rely on case-by-case judgments? The answer to these
wishes may in fact lie in the realm of the possible. The Toys "R"
Us17 8 and similar tests tried to do precisely that, but they left too
many open questions, which resulted in the uneven treatment of
surveys across cases and an endangerment of reliance values in the
legal system.
A number of scholars have debated in what
conditions rules, which create ex ante requirements, are more
17 9
efficient than standards, which establish ex post requirements.
The most important factor in determining the efficiency of each
of these two methods for a given situation is the frequency with
which a certain rule or standard will have to be applied-rules
tend to be more efficient in situations in which a great number of
similar cases exist.1 80
This is clearly true of trademark
infringement surveys: they are a necessary component of proving
trademark infringement in a great number of lawsuits and they
generally resemble each other in many ways. 8' Furthermore,
establishing the ex ante rules proposed in this article would not
offer additional opportunities to "game" the judicial system
through creative lawyering182 because following the rules would
177 Professor Douglas Lichtman raised the question to me whether, in a model that
involves PTO pre-clearance of surveys, the PTO would have a role in helping the parties to
choose and prepare their experts. I would opt against giving the PTO this role under the
rationale that this would be 1) a presumably expensive addition to my proposal; 2) a
profound change to today's PTO (whereas examining questions directly tied to
infringement relates to its current function in choosing what marks to register or cancel);
and 3) unnecessary; if proper guidelines for survey constructions existed, the free market
would likely allow for appropriate expert selection and experts would need no further
guidance than lawyers themselves can provide in a consistent legal system.
178 See supra Subpart III.A.1.
179 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992).
180 See id. at 585-86. Kaplow states specifically:
Whether the ideal time to acquire and disseminate information is ex ante or ex
post depends, most importantly, on the frequency with which the information
will be used. The savings from a single ex ante investigation will be great when
the use of the results will be frequent, but will be negligible when the use of the
results will be unlikely.
Id. at 585.
181 The resemblance amongst surveys is part of the larger argument in this article: there
is a social science consensus as to the construction of some key building blocks of surveys.
182 One of the main areas in which creative lawyering is a problem is tax law. As one
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not provide any guarantee of success in the courts. Rather, the
rules would only establish a floor below which the quality of a
survey could not fall to be considered in any further proceedings.
This Part proposes several concrete requirements that courts
should set in the form of substantive rules and ideally combine
with the procedural changes outlined in Part IV.A of this article.
Theoretically, there is the possibility that Congress could delineate
some of these standards in an amendment to the Lanham Act
under the rationale that members of Congress could pull together
information from experts and develop a uniform framework for
trademark litigation.
This idea, however, presents several
difficulties. First, it would introduce an unprecedented type of
detail into the Lanham Act. Second, at times a certain level of
flexibility or exceptions is reasonable, and fixating guidelines in
the statutory framework itself rather than allowing judicial
presumptions could introduce too much rigidity. Third, progress
in social science research methods may require adjustments to any
rules in the future, and requiring Congress to amend the Lanham
Act whenever that occurs could prove unwieldy and impractical.
Thus, courts are probably in a better position to implement
substantive guidelines.
1. The Proper Stimulus
Courts should presumptively require surveys to include either
the product itself or an accurate visual depiction of the product as
the stimulus presented to subjects. Most of the surveys that the
Second Circuit has found acceptable already used a visual
depiction of the product, so this in no way represents a major
change to survey requirements but is rather a clarification in
doctrine."' 3 The decision of whether to use the actual product or
another depiction should depend on whether the products in
question possess other characteristics such as texture or smell that
cannot be conveyed by a mere image. l" Because consumers take
in the totality of a product in the marketplace, an image alone
would be insufficient if there is any doubt that texture or smell
would make a difference in the totality of factors that point toward
scholar explains: "Because the system focuses on transactions rather than on income, and
because those transactions themselves are not always defined in a way that correlates with
their underlyina purpose, the system is easily subject to manipulation." loshua D.
Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REv. 365, 444 (1988).
183 It is understood that courts would presumptively continue to require that both the
original and the allegedly infringing product be presented as part of the survey.
184 In an Internet survey, for instance, sound could easily be incorporated into the
study as well, while these other attributes could not. Policy reasons may also exist to not
show survey subjects actual products of a threatening nature, such as guns, and thus
accurate images may prove more appropriate in those cases.
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or away from the existence of a trademark violation.
This approach would allow researchers to know definitively
what stimuli will be acceptable on their face in trademark
infringement cases, and, more importantly, what stimuli will not.
Special problems would still exist for other forms of confusion,
such as initial interest confusion, because that type of confusion
may occur when subjects are still at a distance from a product and
may only see some of its elements. For instance, a soda bottle with
black liquid in it and a red-and-white label may mistakenly attract a
consumer because he believes it to be Coca Cola, but when the
consumer steps closer to the product, it may turn out to be a
product by another brand. This may hurt the consumer in several
ways, such as by wasting his time." 5 The fact that only certain
elements are visible in the marketplace should, however, not
prevent researchers from using the actual product with all
markings in a survey. In the soda bottle example, researchers
would simply have the choice to use the actual product as a
stimulus and ask consumers to stand a few feet away from it the
way they would at a supermarket. Disallowing modified products
in trademark surveys would thus not stand in the way of
uncovering initial interest confusion in this or other cases through
similar, specific measures that researchers are still free to take.
If researchers choose to use an image of a product, they
should be required to display all the facets of the product that a
Ideally, in
consumer would encounter in the marketplace.
Internet surveys, researchers could easily use modern "virtual
tour" technology that allows the display of an object and
manipulation by mouse to view all three dimensions. Because inperson studies can understandably present considerable expenses,
the question of confusion could thus be handled properly on the
Internet for many products.

185 See Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: InitialInterest Confusion, Consumer Search
Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 SEAT'rLE U. L. REV. 97, 109 (2004). Grynberg
states:
rlnidal interest confusion is not a guided missile precisely targeting only those
consumers who will decide that the alleged infringer's product is superior to
that of the trademark holder's. It also affects consumers who wish to purchase
the trademarked brand and must expend extra effort to find it. Their
confusion, though ultimately dispelled, increases search costs even when they
ultimately purchase from the trademark owner. Also, many of the diverted
consumers would have preferred the initial target of their search, but settle for
the infringer's product because finding the trademark holder would be too
much trouble. It is these increased consumer search costs that justify judicial
attention to initial interest confusion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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2. The Proper Control Stimulus
Just as judges can approve of survey stimuli on their face prior
to trial, they can do the same for control stimuli. The control
stimulus should be presented in the same medium as the survey
stimulus, so that a survey stimulus in the form of a physical
product would be matched with another physical product, an
image with another image, and so forth. One possible judicial
presumption could be that an actual, existing control product or
image should be used such as to counter the possibility to
manipulate the control stimulus. At the same time, this may not
be feasible for every market if such a product is not available, or if
only one is available that would produce no confusion at all.'86 As
stated earlier, "if in a particular test, a control stimulus is so
different that no respondent would ever guess it, even when it is
the only stimulus shown, then such a control cannot measure
whether people are guessing with response to the stimulus of
actual interest. .".."187 A potential compromise could be to set the
judicial presumption at demanding an existing product to be used
as the control stimulus, but only require an intermediate standard
for rebutting this presumption as opposed to the high standard
that would be required to rebut the presumptions discussed in the
survey stimulus context. 8
3. The Proper Questions
Courts need to define the types of questions that will be
acceptable in the trademark context. Fortunately, the procedural
component of the proposal in this article would correct any
problems in question formulation at the pre-trial stage. The most
important lesson to learn from the Second Circuit's analysis of
trademark-related cases is that questions need to be precise89 and
186 See, e.g., Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399, 2004 WL
602295, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004) rev'd in part, 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2887 (2006) ("It is difficult to determine.., exactly how a control could
have been helpfully employed in the... survey. Any non-COHIBA word trademark would
not serve as an effective control, while a fictional third COHIBA cigar would clearly
infringe on the senior mark.").
187 See Rappeport, supra note 62, at 987. This means that if someone were, for instance,
to claim that Pepsi Cola bottles and their content infringe on the equivalent Coca-Cola
products, the actual survey stimulus would be a full Pepsi Cola bottle and the control
stimulus would have to consist of a product at least somewhat similar to the Pepsi bottle
rather than of an orange juice carton; after all, there is little evidentiary value in the fact
that more people would confuse a Pepsi bottle with a Coca-Cola bottle than would
confuse an orange juice carton with a Coca-Cola bottle.
188 See supra Part IV.B.1.
189 See, e.g., Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 660 (2d Cir. 1979)
(rejecting the survey question "With whom or what do you associate a product labelled
Bionic?" which should have been formulated "With whom or what do you associate a
'Bionic' boot?"); see also Artemio Rivera, Testing the Admissibility of Trademark Surveys After
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Accordingly, it appears sensible to set the
non-leading."1
following judicial presumptions: first, questions must contain the
exact name of the potentially infringing product or otherwise
clearly identify the survey stimulus. 9 ' Second, the question may
not suggest on its own the brand or other product with which one
may associate the survey stimulus. A proper question would thus
ask "Who do you think makes this bottle?" rather than "Is there
any chance this bottle is made by Coca-Cola?" 9 ' Third, questions
may not use any adjectives to qualify a term and thus attempt to
hint at an answer, such as "What large company do you think
makes this bottle?" Ideally, in fact, the question should not even
hint at whether a product is manufactured by an individual versus
a company. A good question would ask "Who makes this bottle?"
rather than "What company makes this bottle?" There are no
clear disadvantages to the question types proposed here as long as
they are stated in precise, understandable terms. Fourth, surveys
should ask follow-up questions in which it could become apparent
These should take the form
what caused any existing confusion.'
of "What makes you say that?" or "Why is that your answer?"'94
Daubert, 84J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 661, 680-81 (2002) ("Survey questions must
be clear and use wording that [is] easy to understand by the average person in the target
population.... Since factors such as age, sub cultural group, and region can affect the
meaning of a word, researchers should use simple language and avoid wording that can
have multiple interpretations.").
190 See, e.g., Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (rejecting the question "Do you think that there may or may not be a business
connection between Beneficial Capital Corp. and the Beneficial Finance System
Companies?").
191 Another clear way of identifying the survey stimulus would be by stating, for
instance, "Who do you think made the product labeled A?"
192 Rivera distinguishes certain situations, however, in which questions should not be
entirely open-ended and cautions how experts must vary the order of questions if they use
close-ended ones. Rivera, supra note 189, at 683-85.
193 Shari Seidman Diamond has in fact criticized the failure of surveys to ask follow-up
questions in the mail survey context by stating that "[o]pen-ended questions are generally
of limited value on a mail survey because they depend entirely on the respondent to
answer fully and do not provide the opportunity to probe or clarify unclear answers."
Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Surey Research, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 263-64 (2d ed. 2000). Asking the follow-up questions proposed
in this article would at least partly alleviate this problem. Another step (discussed infra
Part IV.B.4) would be to suggest further post-study follow-up for certain studies.
194 A few more issues surround the requirements for proper questions. Importantly,
there has been disagreement about the best way to discourage people from guessing the
answers to survey questions. For an explanation of why introducing an admonition
against guessing or an "I don't know" option may not be helpful, see Rappeport, supra
note 62, at 984 (footnote omitted):
It is frequently claimed that giving a respondent an initial instruction "not to
guess," or "not to be afraid to say they don't know" will, in fact, reduce the
tendency to guess.... [I]n the real world, such an admonition generally does
not have any discernible effect on respondents. This absence of an effect is an
outgrowth of the underlying reason for a respondent's guessing, namely, that
respondents assume that there are answers to the questions posed. Given this
assumption, an admonition "not to guess" is as likely to confirm for some
respondents that there is a "right" answer that they should be smart enough to
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The Proper Environment

The survey should be conducted in the same setting or
medium in which the sale of the potentially infringing product
would occur. Demonstrating confusion as part of an Internet
study would thus be acceptable for products sold over the Internet
or equivalent contexts such as mail-order catalogues. The Internet
would, however, not be acceptable for products only sold, for
instance, in supermarkets, because of the large variation of
environmental cues in the two media. Yet, this presumption could
be overcome if data could demonstrate that an in-person study is
not feasible and if the Internet study yielded large amounts of
confusion. Phone studies would be eliminated, with the possible
exception of surveys for products available through direct
telemarketing. Any settings that do not involve in-person contact
would have to include a mechanism to ask further follow-up
questions if the answers are unclear after the first set of follow-up
questions already in the original study. For instance, one could
mandate follow-up questions for any research subjects that did not
explicitly answer according to the directions in the study.'9 5
5. Discussion
The procedural and substantive components of the proposal
represent two discrete sets of ideas that courts could implement
either separately or together in an attempt to unify the treatment
of trademark surveys, decrease costs, and increase people's ability
to rely on a body of clear law. While this article recommends
using both components together, there is nothing illogical about
choosing one or. the other. There are probably many variations
and alternatives to the suggestions made here. The main point is,
however, that trademark law would benefit from clarification and
that courts should study how this goal can be achieved, whether
through the proposal in this article or by other means.
It is always problematic when an area of law lacks precise
know, and thus to encourage guessing, as it is to discourage guessing among
other respondents.... This general admonition against guessing sometimes is
manifested as an insistence upon the value of including as an answer category to
individual questions: "I don't know." Including an "I don't know" option is...
less likely to encourage guessing and thus may be a harmless practice, although
not of real value.
Id. But see Jacob Jacoby, A Critique of Rappeport's "Litigation Surveys-Social 'Science' As
Evidence, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1480, 1482-87 (2002) (disagreeing with Rappeport).
Another alternative is the introduction of so-called "full-filter questions" in which subjects
are first asked if they know about the substantive subject matter of the survey and
questioning only continues if they express that they do. See Rivera, supra note 189, at 68182. Rivera also explores when control questions are appropriate. Id. at 686-88.
195 While these proposals do not specifically discuss the topic of trademark dilution,
they are all applicable to dilution surveys as well.
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definitions, particularly when the related cases involve great
amounts of money in damages and other costs. While the world of
potential trademark violations may never allow for black-and-white
decisions because of the necessity of examining the mental state of
consumers, the possibility to set certain boundaries does exist.
This should happen by making explicit the guidelines that courts
seem to have employed in most cases and clarifying ambiguous
areas of the law. The larger goal here is to identify and prevent
the
disallowing
while
infringement
trademark
true
monopolization of an entire industry through over-protection.
The only way to advance toward that goal is to standardize the use
of trademark survey evidence, such that laws, rather than men, can
dominate the field. It has been stated in the criminal law context:
"Truth, though unattainable in all of its labyrinthic extremities,
must always be the judicial goal. It is the purpose undergirding
our rules of evidence." 96 Courts should strive to follow this
principle to the best of their abilities in the civil context as well
and define their rules of operation accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION

Trademark infringement surveys have had a tumultuous
history: first deemed inadmissible, then admitted and later
transformed by the Daubert standard, they are now one of the
Courts'
touchstones of trademark infringement litigation.
with
riddled
remains
however,
of surveys,
treatment
inconsistencies, and creates insecurity for litigators as well as
survey constructors. This article exemplifies the current status of
trademark surveys by extensively discussing the way in which
courts within the Second Circuit have handled surveys generally,
and their contents specifically. To remedy the lack of guidance
that litigants receive in the areas of survey stimuli, questions, and
environments, this article presents a model of substantive
guidelines that courts should establish to determine survey
Ideally, courts would implement a procedure
admissibility.
through which judges or the PTO could pre-screen whether
surveys meet these guidelines before the surveys' actual execution.
This would allow judges to declare whether particular surveys are
admissible on their face, which would cut the costs involved in
conducting the most unreliable types of surveys and avoid many
surprises regarding admissibility during trial.
The model suggested here would benefit from further
research into the details of both its substantive and procedural
196

State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1343 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1984).
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components. This article points to the deficiencies in the current
system but remains open to different possibilities as to the exact
degree to which judges or the PTO should scrutinize surveys
before declaring them admissible on their face, the procedure
through which litigants should submit survey proposals and the
number of times they should be able to do so, as well as several
other questions. While each of these issues warrants examination
and empirical research regarding the efficiency and feasibility of
various solutions, this article aims to open the dialogue about an
area whose inconsistencies much of the scholarly literature has
overlooked for too long.

